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NOTES
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS
OF THE BREATHALYZER AMPOULE: THE PROBABLE
VIRGINIA RESPONSE
The use of chemical testing of bodily substances as evidence in
criminal prosecutions in the United States has increased markedly
in the last two decades.' Although many commentators maintain
that the availability of scientific testing has facilitated greatly the
administration of criminal justice,2 evidentiary use of such test re-
sults has created unique difficulties. One such problem has been the
defendant's right to "cross-examine" chemical test results intro-
duced by the prosecution by making an independent analysis of the
test material or components of the test machinery Several recent
challenges by criminal defendants have centered around the use of
a particular breath testing device, the breathalyzer. Used by law
enforcement agencies to determine the blood-alcohol content of a
person suspected of drunken driving, the breathalyzer provides test
results that will lead to a statutorily mandated presumption of in-
toxication when the reading exceeds a certain level.4 For this reason,
impeachment of the test results is critical to the defendant's case;
defendants have claimed that without the opportunity to run an
independent test, they cannot rebut effectively the presumption of
intoxication.
The challenge to the admission of breathalyzer results consis-
tently has centered around one small component of the machine,
the ampoule.5 The breathalyzer ampoule is a small, glass vial in
1. See McCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 209 (E. Cleary ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
2. Id.
3. "Breathalyzer" is the brand name of a particular breath testing device. The name often
is used in the literature and court opinions in its generic form, and will be so used in this
article. For a detailed discussion of the machine itself and the breathalyzer testing process,
see note 34 tnfra & accompanying text.
4. The presumption of intoxication derived from breathalyzer test readings above a certain
level is discussed at notes 45 & 46 infra & accompanying text.
5. The breathalyzer machine actually has two ampoules: a standardized, reference am-
poule that is used as a means of determining the change in the test ampoule when the
defendant's breath is introduced; and the test ampoule itself. Although most courts consider-
ing the issue have concentrated on the test ampoule, as used in this paper, ampoule applies
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which a sample of the defendant's breath is mixed with a chemical
solution. The solution will change color depending on the amount
of alcohol in the defendant's breath and will cause the machine to
register in proportion to this change. Traditionally, law enforcement
officers have discarded the ampoule subsequent to administration
of the test.
Defendants have challenged the unavailability of the breathaly-
zer ampoule because it deprives them of the right to analyze inde-
pendently the contents and construction of the ampoule. Such an
analysis, defendants have argued, provides the most effective cross-
examination of the breathalyzer results introduced by the prosecu-
tion and allows a defendant to impeach those results with his own
scientific data.6 Without the ampoule, a defendant is refused evi-
dence valuable to his defense and denied his due process right to
fundamental fairness at trial.7 Defense counsel usually presents this
due process claim in the form of a pretrial motion to suppress
breathalyzer test results because the prosecution is unable to fur-
nish the ampoule upon a discovery motion.' Additionally, the de-
fense may move to dismiss the drunken driving charge entirely on
the basis of the ampoule's unavailability I
to both reference and test ampoules unless otherwise indicated. For a more detailed descrip-
tion of the ampoules and their function in the breathalyzer process, see notes 35 & 36 infra
& accompanying text.
6. For a listing of the ways in which independent analysis of breathalyzer ampoules may
provide the defendant with evidence to impeach the results of the prosecution's test, see notes
83-87 infra & accompanying text.
7. The basis of the due process claim is summarized at note 52 tnfra & accompanying text.
8. The defense counsel simultaneously may make the motion to discover the ampoules and
the motion to suppress breathalyzer test results, if the ampoules prove undiscoverable. Of
critical importance for the defense is to make these motions on a pretrial basis, with the hope
that the motion to suppress will be successful and this prevent breathalyzer test results from
reaching the jury. For an extensive treatment of procedure for defense counsel in a drunken
driving case, see R. ERwiN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES (3d ed. 1971).
9. A court that determines that the unavailability of the breathalyzer ampoule constitutes
a violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial can act on that finding in one of two ways.
First, if the finding is that the ampoule could establish conclusively the defendant's inno-
cence, then the court may conclude that such evidence is critical to the effectiveness of the
accused's defense so that, absent the ampoule, he cannot have a fair trial. In this instance,
the court can dismiss the charges against the defendant.
Second, courts have held that dismissal is appropriate when the defense can show that the
state's destruction of ampoules was in bad faith. Purposeful, bad faith destruction of the
evidence raises an inference that such ampoule could demonstrate affirmatively defendant's
innocence. In People v. Hitch, the court noted in dictum that
[a] bad faith failure to preserve the ampoules and their contents is susceptible
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In determining what effect the inaccessibility of the breathalyzer
ampoule should have on the defendant's right to due process, the
courts have divided into two groups: those courts finding a due
process violation based on the ampoule's destruction and therefore
granting the motion to suppress,"0 and those courts finding that the
defendant's lack of an opportunity to perform an independent anal-
ysis of the breathalyzer ampoule does not constitute prejudicial
error of constitutional dimension and therefore denying the motion
to suppress. The California Supreme Court addressed the ampoule-
retention controversy more exhaustively than any court thus far in
People v. Hitch:" therefore, the rationale for finding a due process
violation will be identified in this Note as the Hitch position. The
courts that find no due process violation when ampoules are una-
vailable to the defendant will be denominated as adhering to the
Canaday position, referring to State v. Canaday" in which the Su-
preme Court of Washington denied the defendant's motion to sup-
press.
Although the Virginia courts have not considered the due process
of the inference that they were destroyed because the actual test results were
different from those reported. [B]ad faith destruction raises an inference
that the ampoules could demonstrate innocence. In such an instance dismissal
may well be the proper sanction.
12 Cal. 3d 641, -, 527 P.2d 361, 370 n.70, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, - (1974).
In Hitch, the trial court had granted the defendant's motion to suppress breathalyzer test
results and the motion to dismiss the charges. Noting, however, that it was too stringent a
sanction on the prosecution and that suppression of breathalyzer test results would be suffi-
cient remedy for the defendant, the California Supreme Court reversed the dismissal. 11 Cal.
3d 159, -, 520 P.2d 974, 977, 113 Cal. Rptr. 158, - (1974). Upon rehearing, the supreme
court reversed the trial court on the suppression issue. The court maintained that ampoule
destruction is a due process violation, but chose not to apply the rule in Hitch, opting instead
for only prospective application. 12 Cal. 3d 641, -, 527 P.2d 361, 370-71, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9,
-(1974).
10. Although the court that finds a due process violation may deem dismissal the appropri-
ate remedy when the facts of the case so require, a more moderate approach would be to retain
the case but suppress the breathalyzer test to prevent it from prejudicing the defendant.
Both the state and the defendant thus would be required to rely on evidence other than that
derived from the breathalyzer test, evidence of the type used m drunken driving cases before
chemical tests were utilized. Suppression then would balance the equities between the parties
but still permit the case to proceed. As noted by the court in Hitch, because evidence from a
breathalyzer is not an essential element of a prosecution or conviction for drunken driving,
there is no reason to forbid the prosecution's reliance on other evidence when test results are
suppressed. 11 Cal. 3d at -, 520 P.2d at 977, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
11. 11 Cal. 3d 159, 520 P.2d 974, 113 Cal. Rptr. 158, vacated and rev'd on rehearing, 12
Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
12. 90 Wash. 2d 808, 585 P.2d 1185 (1978).
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implications of the -prosecution's destruction of the breathalyzer
ampoule, the case law and statutory treatment'3 of chemical testing
as evidence in drunken driving cases suggest that the courts in
Virginia would adopt the Canaday position that "the used breatha-
lyzer test ampoules are not material evidence in a constitutional
sense and nondisclosure of the ampoules caused by routine destruc-
tion and disposal is not constitutional error."' 4 To support this pre-
diction of the probable position of the Virginia courts on ampoule
retention, this Note examines the general use of chemical test evi-
dence in Virginia, the principle and processes of the breathalyzer
machine itself, and the basis of the due process challenge in other
courts. Finally, this Note suggests an approach to the ampoule-
retention problem that accommodates both the needs of the prose-
cution and the rights of the defendant in drunken driving cases.
CHEMICAL TEST EVIDENCE
Drunken Driving in Virginia
Recognition of the danger to the public posed by the drunken
driver is expressed in section 18.2-266 of the Virginia Code, which
states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate
any motor vehicle, engine or train while under the influence of alco-
hol."' 5 In Mitchell v. Wilkerson," the Virginia Supreme Court
echoed that sentiment, stating that "[d]riving a motor vehicle
under the influence of intoxicants is universally recognized as creat-
ing a very serious hazard on the highways."' 7 In prosecutions for
driving while intoxicated, the commonwealth must establish be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was operating 8 the
13. Provisions for chemical testing in driving-while-intoxicated prosecutions are codified
at VA. CODE § 18.2-266 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
14. 90 Wash. 2d at -, 585 P.2d at 1189.
15. In Virginia, drunken driving constitutes a Class 2 misdemeanor. VA. CODE § 18.2-270.
16. 193 Va. 121, 67 S.E.2d 912 (1951).
17. Id. at 128, 67 S.E.2d at 916.
18. Under Virginia law, "operating" a vehicle carries a broader meaning than driving a
vehicle. Operating includes starting the engine or manipulating the equipment of the vehicle
even without actually putting it into motion if the defendant had actual physical control of
the car and had engaged the machinery that would have activated the vehicle's motive power.
Williams v. City of Petersburg, 216 Va. 297, 217 S.E.2d 893 (1975) (defendant deemed to be
operating vehicle although it was not in motion and although defendant was found slumped
over the wheel; the motor was running and the automobile was capable of immediate motion).
See also Nicolls v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 257, 184 S.E.2d 9 (1971) (defendant was found
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automobile and that while doing so, he was under the influence of
alcohol.19 The accused is not required to offer evidence of his inno-
cence until the commonwealth has excluded every reasonable hy-
pothesis of innocence. 0 The determination of whether the defendant
was intoxicated is ultimately one of fact for the jury 21
The Virginia legislature approved chemical tests in 1954.2 Before
this codification, chemical tests were admitted into evidence but
were accompanied by the court's disclaimer that "we are not called
upon to express any opinion relative to the admissibility of evidence
obtained by means of chemical test to determine intoxication. '"
The court added the caveat that the results were "not conclusive or
binding upon the jury nor do such findings raise any presumption
at law of the guilt of defendant, but the jury is to give only such
weight to this evidence as they might think it entitled to. '24 During
this era, the attitude of Virginia courts to chemical testing was
almost casual; one author remarked that as of 1954, "[v]ery few
scientific detection methods ha[d] claimed the attention of the
Virginia courts." Virginia's decision to use chemical tests in
slumped over steering wheel with the car in operating lane, its motor running and lights on;
although the car was inoperable, defendant was found to be operating a vehicle within the
meaning of the statute).
19. Clemmer v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 661, 159 S.E.2d 664 (1968). Before 1956, the
offense of driving "while under the influence of alcohol" had not been defined specifically in
Virginia. If the accused were found to be under the influence of alcohol, his ability to drive
safely was presumed to have been affected. Owens v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 624, 136 S.E.
765 (1927). Later statutory refinement, however, required that the effect of alcohol must be
"apparent to observation." Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 954, 81 S.E.2d 614, 619
(1954). Chemical testing has minimized dependence on evidence obtained from observation
alone.
20. Clemmer v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 661, 666, 159 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1968).
21. Id.
22. 1954 Va. Acts, ch. 406 (codified at VA. CODE § 18-75.1 (Supp. 1954)). See 18 WASH. &
LEE L. Rav. 370 (1961).
23. Omohundro v. Arlington County, 194 Va. 773, 778, 75 S.E.2d 496, 499 (1953).
24. Id. at 777, 75 S.E.2d at 498. Omohundro preceded legislation concerning procedural
requirements of chemical test administration and of the presumptions to be drawn from test
results. The facts of the case indicated that the test had been administered by an officer who
made no control test either before or after using the machine and who had only two days of
training in its use. The court concluded that because the officer was only reporting the
machine reading and was neither offering his opinion nor his analysis, his lack of qualification
was immaterial. The court also concluded that the reading had "no meaning" to the jury
because it was not explained in the record as requiring any conclusion, and therefore, could
be permitted into evidence without prejudice to defendant. Id.
25. C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 172 (1977), quoting THE LAw OF EVIDENCE
IN ViRGINIA AND WEST VnIGINLA § 147 (Nash ed. 1954). Friend notes that as of 1977, in addition
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connection with driving-while-intoxicated prosecutions was based
on a desire "to remedy the contradictions which developed in the
prosecution of cases . where convictions were sought on evidence
of symptoms of behavior and condition of an accused at the
time of his alleged offense. The obvious purpose was to provide a
more accurate and definite test.""6 Among the chemical tests that
Virginia has adopted for measuring intoxication is the breath test.
to admitting tests for blood alcohol content, Virginia had admitted evidence such as finger-
prints, radar speed tests, and analysis of chemicals to determine narcotic substances. Other
scientific evidence receiving consideration in Virginia courts, but as yet deemed inadmissible,
were the results of polygraph tests and truth serum. Id. at §§ 172-79. On the subject of
polygraph test result admissibility in Virginia, see Skinner v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 260,
183 S.E.2d 725 (1971); Lee v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 233, 105 S.E.2d 152 (1958).
26. Bowman v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 656, 660, 112 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1960). In Kay v.
United States, the court considered the blood test more objective than the statutorily defined
test of intoxication. 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1958). See also United States v. Gholson, 319
F Supp. 499, 504 (E.D. Va. 1970). The reasoning of the Virginia courts on the utility of
chemical tests was employed in jurisdictions across the country. The primary benefit noted
was the move away from complete reliance on an officer's opinion as to whether a driver was
intoxicated. Policemen have subscribed to indefinite and sometimes misleading terms to
describe intoxication such as, "unsteady on feet, glassy eyes, odor of alcohol, incoherent
speech, lack of muscular coordination, [and] erratic operation of vehicle." Bellotti, The
Preparation and Trial of a Drunken Driving Case Involving a Breathalyzer, 1 NAT'L J. CrIM.
DEF. 131, 132 (1975). Scientific tests for intoxication are particularly useful when what appear
to be the objective signs of intoxication are in fact symptoms of a pathological physical
condition that is unconnected with intoxication. In People v. Thomas, the officer testified
that the defendant's breath smelled of alcohol, and he acted in a confused and disoriented
manner. 34 Ill. App. 3d 578, 340 N.E.2d 174 (1975). The court concluded that this did not
establish intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant had sustained an inter-
cerebral hematoma as a result of the accident, and the slurred speech and unsure balance
might have resulted from the head injury. For other cases in which courts have examined
pathological conditions creating ostensible symptoms of intoxication, see People v. Stanley,
24 Ill. App. 3d 993, 322 N.E.2d 228 (1975) (diabetes); People v. MacPhail, 24 Ill. App. 3d
399, 321 N.E.2d 386 (1974) (prior neck injury); People v. Herzog, 75 Misc. 2d 631, 348
N.Y.S.2d 510 (1973) (concussion); State v. Miracle, 33 Ohio App. 2d 289, 294 N.E.2d 903
(1973) (migraine headache). See generally 1 R. ERwIN, supra note 8, at § 11.01, wherein the
author enumerates sixty pathological conditions recognized by the National Safety Council
as causing symptoms typically identified with intoxication. Finally, courts have adopted
chemical testing as a "new and more objective test and definition designed to protect
an accused whose faculties are not impaired, while withholding protection from one one, who,
under the sobering influence of accident or arrest, is able to avoid the appearance of intoxica-
tion." Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1958). Some commentators believe
that the legislators were aware of the fallibility of testing: "By providing for more than one
[blood] test the [Virginia] Code implicitly recognized that unavoidable error inheres in any
scientific measurement." Carter, Flora, Van Bowen & Myers, Statistics and the Virginia
Blood Test Statute, 56 VA. L. REv. 349, 350 (1970).
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Breath Testing
Chemical testing for intoxication became possible when scientists
recognized that the amount of alcohol in the brain could be mea-
sured to determine the level of intoxication. Although a direct test
of alcohol in the brain was impossible, a test of alcohol in the blood
was recognized as a useful substitute for a test of brain tissue. "7 The
next step in chemical testing for intoxication led to the development
of breath testing to gauge the amount of alcohol in the blood; the
alcohol diffuses from the blood into the air of the lower lungs when
blood circulates through the lungs.
Breath testing has become popular with law enforcement officers
because of its ease of administration. Unlike blood tests, breath
checks may be performed by anyone with instruction in a simple
procedure and do not require a person with extensive medical train-
ing.2 In addition, the subjects view breath testing as less intrusive
and physically uncomfortable than a blood test, and therefore are
more likely to cooperate with its administration. 9
Experts disagree concerning the accuracy of breath testing. Some
maintain that breath testing does not reach the level of precision of
a direct blood test;3" others contend that modem breath tests sur-
pass both blood and urine tests in the precision and accuracy with
which they measure blood-alcohol content.3' Nevertheless, breath
testing has become recognized widely in criminal proceedings as an
acceptable test for indicating the level of intoxication.32
27. Watts, Some Observations on Police-Administered Tests for Intoxication, 45 N.C.L.
Rxv. 34, 49 (1966). The author notes that other bodily fluids such as saliva or spinal fluid
might also be tested but are of little value due to the impracticality of administration. Id. at
55 n.67.
28. Whether expertise is necessary often is asked when defendant seeks to impeach the
credibility of breathalyzer test results. Although jurisdictions differ on the extent of expertise
and understanding an oberator must demonstrate in the breathalyzer process, the over-
whelming majority agree that basic proficiency with the device, as demonstrated by a certifi-
cate of training, is a necessary part of laying the foundation for test result admissibility. See
Watts, supra note 27, at 65.
29. Other modem intoxication testing devices include sound motion pictures and videotape
recordings. See Watts, supra note 27, at 59.
30. 1 R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at §§ 18.01-.4.
31. Watts, supra note 27, at 55-56.
32. See Coldwell & Grant, A Study of Some Factors Affecting the Accuracy of the
Breathalyzer, 8 J. FoR. Sc. 149 (1963).
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The Breathalyzer Process
The most popular breath testing device33 in use today by law
enforcement agencies is the breathalyzer 4 which was invented in
1954 and has been refined steadily since that time. The breathalyzer
operates in three basic steps: the breath sample is collected when
the subject exhales into the machine; the breath passes through a
solution in the test ampoule; and the loss of color in the test am-
poule solution caused by the alcohol in the defendant's breath is
measured and a reading is given.
When the subject exhales into the mouthpiece of the machine,
only the last 52.5 cubic centimeters of the exhalation are trapped.
The breath then is driven by a piston through the ampoule contain-
ing potassium dichromate in a solution of sulphuric acid. As the
breath moves through the test ampoule solution, the alcohol is ex-
tracted from the breath, and the solution loses its original color in
an amount relative to the amount of alcohol in the subject's mouth.
The amount of color change in the test ampoule solution is mea-
sured by photoelectric cells connected to a galvanometer. Initially,
the galvanometer is balanced between the test and reference am-
poules to assure passage of an equal amount of light through each
ampoule. When the test ampoule solution color fades after being
exposed to the subject's breath, however, more light passes through
the test ampoule than the reference ampoule, and the galvanometer
is no longer balanced. The adjustment necessary to reinstate the
initial balance between ampoules gives the reading that indicates
the amount of alcohol in the subject's breath. Because the alcohol
in the breath will register at 2100 times the amount present in the
blood, the alcoholic content of the blood can be determined by
dividing by 2100.
33. The breathalyzer is one of several breath-testing instruments used by law enforce-
ment agencies. Other authorized types include the Drunkometer, the Alcometer, the Intoxi-
meter, the Kitagawa-Wright Apparatus, and a variety of preliminary screening tests. For a
detailed description of these devices, see Watts, supra note 27, at 56-77.
34. The breathalyzer was developed by Dr. Robert F Borkenstem. Models now available
are the 900, 900A, 1000 and 1100. 2 R. EawiN, supra note 8, at 22. The breathalyzer appears
on the list of evidential breath measurement devices of the Department of Transportation,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 41 Fed. Reg. 41,737 (1976).
35. The 2100:1 ratio and the principle behind breath testing is an application of Henry's
Law, which states that when a volatile substance is dissolved, a predetermined percent of
the volatile substance will escape into the air surrounding the liquid. When the solution of a
volatile chemical is brought into equilibrium with air, a fixed ratio exists between the concen-
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This examination of the breathalyzer testing process reveals the
importance of the ampoules to the test. While the operation of the
breathalyzer machine takes place through its many component
parts, "the key to the entire [machine] lies in the ampoules and
in the chemical reaction of the materials in the ampoules, ' ' 31 The
breathalyzer machine requires the use of two ampoules: a sealed
glass vial that is broken open and attached to a bubbler tube so that
the subject's breath may react with its contents; and an unopened
ampoule that is standardized as a reference for comparison with the
test ampoule after the latter has undergone the color change.
Each sealed ampoule should contain three cubic centimeters of
50%-by-volume, sulfuric acid solution and distilled water contain-
ing 0.75 milligrams, or 0.025% potassium dichromate and an equal
amount of silver nitrate catalyst.37 The sulfuric acid in the ampoule
absorbs any alcohol that comes through the ampoule in the breath
sample. Next, the potassium dichromate reacts with and oxidizes
the alcohol, and then itself is consumed, causing the liquid in the
test ampoule to lose its original yellow color." The correct volume
-of liquid in the ampoule is crucial to test results: "The point truly
most critical as to the chemicals in the Breathalyzer is that
each ampoule contain the minimum quantity of reagent.""0 Too
little reagent will give higher results on the final reading.
Recognizing the viability of the breath test as a means for deter-
mining intoxication, the Virginia legislature gave this method statu-
tory status in section 18.2-268 of the Virginia Code.4 ° Breath testing
tration of the compound in the air and its concentration in water. This ratio is constant at a
given temperature; as the temperature rises, the ratio in the-air increases. The temperature
at which breath leaves the mouth is approximately 33.5 degrees centigrade. At this tempera-
ture, the blood-to-air ratio in the deep, alveolar lungs is 2100:1. See Bellotti, supra note 26,
at 145. The ratio indicates that one volume of arterial blood will contain 2100 times as much
alcohol as an equivalent volume of alveolar breath. See Watts, supra note 27, at 57. For
further discussion of the chemical principles of the breathalyzer, see Borkenstein & Smith,
The Breathalyzer and Its Applications, 2 MED. Sci. & L. 13 (1961); Rabinowitz, Medicolegal
Aspect. of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxication, 39 J. CraM. L.C.&P.S. 225 (1948).
36. 2 R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at § 22.03[2][a].
37. The actual breakdown is 0.025% potassium dichromate, 0.025% silver nitrate, and
99.95% sulfuric acid. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Watts, supra note 27, at 89.
40. VA. CODE § 18.2-268 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This provision should be distinguished from
§ 18.2-267, which also provides for breath testing, but refers to preliminary breath tests that
are administered when the accused is stopped, to determine probable alcoholic content as a
1979]
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is first mentioned in the statute as part of the provision dealing with
a driver's implied consent4 to the test.42 A subsequent provision,
(rl) of section 18.2-268, details the procedures for "[c]hemical
analysis of a person's breath to be considered valid."43
basis for the probable cause required to make an arrest. The equipment used for this purpose
is far less sophisticated than the breathalyzer, and the results of the preliminary analysis of
alcoholic content of the breath are inadmissible in court.
41. Implied consent statutes have been enacted thoroughout the country and basically
provide that a person using the state highways is required to submit to either a blood or breath
test when arrested for drunken driving. In Virginia, this consent is deemed neither qualified
nor conditional. Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 170 S.E.2d 199 (1969). Unreasonable
refusal to submit to a chemical test after a drunken driving arrest may cause the accused to
lose his license. United States v. Gholson, 319 F Supp. 499 (E.D. Va. 1970). This penalty,
however, is a completely separate offense from the drunken driving charge. Id.
42. VA. CODE § 18.2-268(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Any person whether licensed by Virginia or not, who operates a motor vehicle
upon a public highway in this State shall be deemed thereby, as a condition
of such operation, to have consented to have a sample of his blood or breath
taken for a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood, if such
person is arrested for violation of § 18.2-266.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
43. VA. CODE § 18.2-268(rl) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Virginia's requirements are as follows:
Chemical analysis of a person's breath, to be considered valid under the
provisions of this section, shall be performed by an individual possessing a valid
license to conduct such tests, with a type of equipment and in accordance with
the methods approved by the Division. Such breath-testing equipment shall be
tested for its accuracy by the Division at least once every six months.
The Division is directed to establish a training program for all individuals who
are to administer the breath tests, of at least forty hours of instruction in the
operation of breath-test equipment and the administration of such tests. Upon
the successful completion of the training program the Division may issue a
license to the individual operator indicating that he has completed the course
and is authorized to conduct a breath-test analysis. Licenses previously issued
by the State Health Commissioner shall continue to be valid until the expiration
date.
Any individual conducting a breath-test under the provisions of this section
and as authorized by the Division shall issue a certificate which will indicate
that the test was conducted in accordance with the manufacturer's specifica-
tions, the equipment on which the breath-test was conducted has been tested
within the past six months and has been found to be accurate, the name of the
accused, the date, the time the sample was taken from the accused, the alcoholic
content of the sample, and by whom the sample was examined. The certificate,
as provided for in this section, when duly attested by the authorized individual
conducting the breath test, shall be admissible in any court in any criminal
proceeding as evidence of the alcoholic content of the blood of the accused. In
no case may the officer making the arrest, or anyone with him at the time of
the arrest or anyone participating in the arrest of the accused, make the breath
test or analyze the results thereof. A copy of such certificate shall be forthwith
delivered to the accused.
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The Presumption of Intoxication Generally
The major significance of the use of breath testing in drunken
driving prosecutions lies in the statutory presumption of intoxica-
tion that results from a breathalyzer reading above a certain level.
The legal presumptions concerning breath test results followed the
continued refinement of chemical tests as indicators of an accused's
blood-alcohol level. When scientists found that alcoholic content of
a subject's blood could be correlated with degrees of intoxication,
the American Medical Association recommended a set of legal pre-
sumptions based on a standardization of the blood-alcohol/
intoxication relationship. These guidelines were adopted by the
National Safety Council Committee on Alcohol and Drugs" and
written into chemical-testing statutes by state legislatures across
the country.
As initially proposed, the presumptions created three zones of
influence. Zone 1 includes those persons having 0.05% or less alcohol
in their blood and gives rise to the presumption that the subject is
not intoxicated. Zone 2 includes those test subjects with a blood-
alcohol content of.between 0.05% and 0.15% and indicates that the
subject may or may not be intoxicated.45 Test subjects with 0.15%
or higher alcohol content in their blood fall into Zone 3 and are
subject to the presumption of intoxication. At least twenty-eight
states, including Virginia, have reduced the percentage at which
intoxication is presumed from 0.15% to 0.10% or higher. 6 This nar-
44. See NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL COMMrIrTEE ON ALCOHOL AND DRUGS, USES OF CHEMCAL TESTS
FOR INTOXICATION (1964), SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGAL MATTERS, NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL CoMIuTrrr
ON ALCOHOL AND DRUGS, ANN. REP. at 1-2 (1965).
45. Although one advantage of the presumption is the elimination of the necessity of expert
testimony on the relation between the alcoholic content of the blood and intoxication, in Zone
2 such testimony still might be required; in Zone 2 neither intoxication nor nonintoxication
is presumed.
46. 1 R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at § 14.02. The Virginia Code provides for the presumptions
arising from the alcoholic content of blood in section 18.2-269:
In any prosecution for a violation of § 18.2-266, or any similar ordinance
the amount of alcohol in the blood of the accused at the time of the alleged
offense as indicated by a chemical analysis of a sample of the accused's blood
or breath to determine the alcoholic content of his blood shall give rise to
the following rebuttable presumptions:
(1) If there was at that time 0.05 percent or less by weight by volume of
alcohol in the accused's blood, it shall be presumed that the accused was not
under the influence of alcoholic intoxicants;
(2) If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 percent but less than 0.10
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rows Zone 2 range to between 0.05% and 0.10%, and broadens Zone
3 so that a reading of 0.10% or higher triggers the presumption.
Like the use of chemical tests for assessing levels of intoxication,
the use of the legislative presumption derived from scientific find-
ings helps eliminate the guesswork from determinations of intoxica-
tion and replaces the opinion of the observing officer with data
based on scientific test results. The presumptions supply a fixed
standard and eliminate the necessity for expert testimony on the
relationship between blood-alcohol content and levels of intoxica-
tion.47 Statutory presumptions of this type, however, only eliminate
expert testimony concerning the effect of alcohol on the body; ex-
perts still may testify as to the operator's qualifications, the test
procedure, and the accuracy of a particular machine."
Statutory presumptions of intoxication derived from breathalyzer
test results are rebuttable rather than conclusive." Admission of
evidence from a breathalyzer test does not preclude the introduction
of other evidence of intoxication or sobriety by the defense or by the
prosecution. Statutes providing for the presumption of intoxication
usually will state that the jury should consider test results and the
presumptions attending those results in conjunction with all other
evidence presented.50 Similarly, the presumption of intoxication
does not change the presumption that the defendant is innocent5'
percent by weight by volume of alcohol in the accused's blood, such facts shall
not give rise to any presumption that the accused was or was not under the
influence of alcoholic intoxicants, but such facts may be considered with other
competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused;
(3) If there was at that time 0.10 percent or more by weight by volume of
alcohol in the accused's blood, it shall be presumed that the accused was under
the influence of alcoholic intoxicants.
VA. CODE § 18.2-269 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
The constitutionality of the Virginia statutory presumption was addressed in Kay v. United
States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958). The Fourth Circuit held that because it is rebuttable,
the presumption neither restricts the defendant in presenting his defense nor deprives him
of the presumption of innocence. Because the jury considers the alcoholic content of the blood
along with all other evidence, the defendant is deprived of no protected right when the
presumption of intoxication is invoked against him by the prosecution. Id.
47. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 748 (1967).
48. Such experts usually will be called by the defense unless the jurisdiction is one in which
experts are required to lay the foundation for the test's admissibility before it can be intro-
duced by the prosecution. The controversy over the feasibility of ampoule retesting itself has
created fertile ground for battle by the experts. See notes 88-101 infra & accompanying text.
49. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 209.
50. Id.
51. For a discussion of the mandate that an accused must be considered innocent until
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until proven guilty, but merely shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant and requires him to adduce evidence of nonintoxication
to rebut the presumption. The standard of proof for the prosecu-
tion's case thus remains that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE TO AMPOULE UNAVAILABILITY
Challenges to the admissibility of a breathalyzer test, which re-
sult when the ampoules are unavailable for independent analysis
by the defendant, are based on denial of the defendant's due pro-
cess rights. Due process guarantees the accused a fair trial, and any
violation of fundamental fairness will constitute a denial of that
guarantee; 2 likewise, a defendant is denied fundamental fairness
when evidence favorable and material to his case is unavailable to
him."
The due process implications of ampoule destruction by the state
must be viewed as a balancing question. The nature of due process
calls for "conform[ity] to fundamental standards of procedure in
criminal trials"5 and promises the defendant no more than treat-
ment "in accordance with the criminal procedures established by
law ",1 Thus, the requirement that the state only need act reasona-
bly qualifies the defendant's right to due process. The scope of the
defendant's due process rights does not include unreasonable de-
mands on the government." In the ampoule-destruction context, a-
determination of whether due process has been violated must be
made with reference to the defendant's right and the prosecution's
duty
guilt is proven, see note 224 infra & accompanying text.
52. "Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and
thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions
cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice."' Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.).
53. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). For elaboration on the Brady rule, see note 57
infra & accompanying text.
54. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238 (1940).
55. P KAUPER, CONSTTuToNAL LAW 601 (4th ed. 1972).
56. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reflect this dual concern. Rule 16, which
provides for discovery of evidence from the prosecution, requires first "a showing of material-
ity of the preparation of the defense" which goes to the defendant's rights and possible
prejudice to him, and then adds "and reasonableness" to condition the defendant's rights by
limiting the burden of the prosecution. FED. R. CRms. P 16.
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The Rule in Brady
The basis for the due process challenge in ampoule-destruction
cases is the United States Supreme Court ruling in Brady v.
Maryland5 that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favora-
ble to an accused violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment. '6 8 Courts examining the
possible due process violation inherent in the destruction of the
ampoules first consider whether information derived from the am-
poules could constitute evidence both favorable and material to the
defendant. If these questions are answered affirmatively, the court
will examine the reasonableness of the demand on the prosecution
that the ampoules be preserved. As a result, even if the requisite
materiality and favorability of evidence are found, the court may
decide that considerations from the prosecution's viewpoint militate
against a finding of a due process violation. 9 The court will look to
the good faith of the prosecution in destroying the ampoule and to
the inconvenience involved in its retention. 0 Several courts have
held that a finding of good faith on the prosecution's part will vitiate
any potential due process violation. Similarly, upon a factual find-
ing that ampoule retention would be too burdensome on the law
enforcement agencies involved, the court may decline to find that
the defendant's due process rights have been violated by the am-
poule's destruction.
The ruling in Brady that evidence material and favorable to the
defendant must not be withheld was based on a situation involving
suppression of evidence.' In most ampoule-retention cases, the de-
struction of evidence, rather than suppression of still extant mate-
rial, is at issue. In order to deal with instances in which evidence
cannot be disclosed because of its destruction, the duty to disclose
57. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the prosecution suppressed evidence which demonstrated
that Brady was not guilty of the murder with which he was charged.
58. Id. at 87. The duty to disclose is, in part, a remedial measure designed to protect the
defendant from the government's greater capacity to investigate by permitting his acquisition
of much of the material relevant to trial.
59. See note 137 infra & accompanying text.
60. Id.
61. See note 57 supra. For cases particularizing the prosecution's duty to disclose, see Levin
v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d
842 (4th Cir. 1964). See also Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence
to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
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enunciated in Brady has been extended to include a duty to preserve
evidence 2 This duty applies not only to the prosecution during the
trial, but to law enforcement officers operating at earlier stages of
investigation; the duty of preservation is imposed from the moment
that the evidence is seized."
Favorability
Courts therefore have applied the Brady rule to ampoule destruc-
tion cases by examining the evidence that might be derived from the
preserved ampoule and applying the two-pronged test of demon-
strating the favorability of the evidence and its materiality "1 Al-
though courts have agreed that the defendant bears the burden of
showing the favorability of the evidence that the ampoule could
provide, 5 they have differed on the degree to which favorability
must be demonstrated. In Canaday and other cases in which courts
have refused to find a due process violation when ampoules have
been destroyed, a stringent reading of the Brady favorability stan-
dard has required that the defendant demonstrate that the am-
poules would raise "a reasonable doubt [as to defendant's guilt]
62. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Bryant, the court mandated
the promulgation of rules of procedure to assure preservation of all discoverable evidence. Id.
at 652. In State v. Michener, 25 Or. App. 523, 550 P.2d 449 (1976), the Court of Appeals of
Oregon refused to acknowledge any difference in the state's duty because evidence had been
destroyed rather than suppressed. The court noted that "[w]hether the evidence remains
available to the state, or has been destroyed, is Irrelevant to the question of whether
the refusal to produce the evidence is violative of the state's duty to disclose." Id. at
550 P.2d at 454.
63. In United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1974), which involved the seizure of
a large amount of marijuana, the court stated in a footnote that "[tihe government is flirting
with the danger of reversal any time evidence is lost or inadvertently destroyed. When evi-
dence is seized, the government should take every reasonable precaution to preserve it." Id.
at 903 n.1. This duty to preserve prevents the state from arguing successfully that the state
is under no duty to disclose that which does not exist. See People v. Godbout, 42 Ill. App. 3d
1001, 356 N.E.2d 865 (1976). Absent the duty to preserve, the prosecution could destroy
evidence and then claim impossibility of compliance. See People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 650,
527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
64. See note 57 supra.
65. 1 R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at § 5B.04A. In State v. Reaves, the court indicated that
favorability of ampoules is a factual finding to be determined anew in each case depending
on whether the defense produces credible evidence of the favorable effect of the ampoule on
the defendant's case. 25 Or. App. 745, 550 P.2d 1403 (1976), quoting State v. Michener, 25
Or. App. 449, 550 P.2d 449 (1976). As to whether a case-by-case determination is practical in
the context of scientific theory, see note 152 infra & accompanying text.
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which did not otherwise exist."6
Courts following the Hitch rationale, however, have been less
demanding in their characterization of the defendant's burden with
respect to the degree of favorability of ampoule-derived evidence
necessary to show a due process violation. Precedent exists for this
less stringent requirement. In Griffin u. United States,7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia mandated
disclosure of "evidence that may reasonably be considered admissi-
ble and useful to defense."6 Similarly, the Third Circuit in Curran
v. Delaware,69 stated that the defendant's due process rights would
be violated unless all "pertinent facts relating to defense" were
disclosed by the state.70
The Hitch standard requires only that the defendant show that
it was "reasonably possible" 7' that ampoule evidence would be fa-
vorable to the defendant's case. Courts following the Hitch preced-
ent have tailored the favorability requirement accordingly In State
v Michener,72 the Court of Appeals of Oregon required a
"reasonable possibility"73 of favorability, adding the caveat that it
be "based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile imagination." 7
In State v. Wright, 5 the Supreme Court of Washington held that
the defendant's rights would be violated if the ampoule evidence
"could possibly have been of assistance" in establishing his de-
fense.76
In considering the facts necessary for a finding of due process
violation when the ampoule is inaccessible to the defendant, courts
66. State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d at -, 585 P.2d at 1189. The court believed that cross-
examination of the test operator could provide the defense with the same information as
ampoule analysis. Id.
67. 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
68. Id. at 993.
69. 259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1958).
70. Id. at 711.
71. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 649, 527 P.2d 361, 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 15 (1974).
72. 25 Or. App. 523, 550 P.2d 449 (1976).
73. Id. at - , 550 P.2d at 454.
74. Id.
75. 87 Wash. 2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976).
76. Id. In Wright, defendant pointed to nine areas in which evidence from the ampoule
might benefit his case. A favorability standard in the spirit of Hitch also was applied in
People v. Noonan, in which the court stated that "it was first the duty of defendant to
demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the ampoule could give evidence on the issue
of guilt which might result in his exoneration." 20 Cal. App. 3d 862, 865, 98 Cal. Rptr. 125,
128 (1971) (emphasis supplied).
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have used a four-part, building-block analysis: in order to constitute
a violation of due process, unavailable evidence must be found to
be favorable to the defendant; in order to be favorable to the defen-
dant, such evidence must be admissible; 7 in order for scientific
evidence to be admissible, it must be scientifically reliable; and in
order for evidence to be scientifically reliable, it must enjoy the
general acceptance of the scientific community 78
The determination of whether ampoule-derived evidence might
be favorable, therefore, begins with an investigation into the scien-
tific reliability of the evidence that the ampoule could furnish. Ab-
sent a finding of reliability, the defendant's due process claim will
fail, as will the motion to suppress the results of the breathalyzer
test that he would have attempted to impeach. The conclusive ef-
fect of the scientific-reliability determination was enunciated by the
Court of Appeals of Ohio in State v. Watson:79
The test ampoule and its solution used in the breathalyzer test
may be "material to the preparation of defense"
77. The court in Canaday was especially concerned about the admissibility of ampoule-
derived evidence. it stated that the primary reason for its departure from Hitch and its
progeny in holding that defendant was not denied due process, despite the destruction of the
test ampoule, was that those cases had been decided "without considering the question
whether proffered expert testimony based on retesting of the ampoules is properly admissi-
ble." 90 Wash. 2d at _, 585 P.2d at 1188-89.
78. The court in Canaday emphasized that "expert testimony may be permitted to reach
a trier of fact only when the reliability of the underlying principles has been accepted by the
scientific community." Id. at ._, 585 P.2d at 1188. The court quoted a 1923 case, Frye v.
United States, 293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), deemed by Professor McCormick to be the first
clear statement of a special evidentiary rule on scientific evidence. McCoRMICK, supra note
1, at § 96. In Frye, the defendant sought to have results of a systolic blood pressure deception
test admitted as evidence of his innocence of a murder charge. In considering the standard
of admissibility of the scientific test results, the court stated:
Just when a scientific principle crosses the line between experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized [but] the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
293 F at 1014. Although noting that the court refused to admit the results because the test
had not gained general acceptance, McCormick observes that a few years after his trial, Frye
was exonerated when another person confessed to the crime. McCoRmicK, supra note 1, at §
96. On the difficult problem of admissibility as determined by scientific reliability, McCor-
mick suggests that the "general scientific acceptance" test should be the parameter for
judicial notice of scientific facts, but not for admissibility. McCormick favors admitting "any
relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness," and reserving the
weighing of such testimony for the jury. Id. at § 203.
79. 48 Ohio App. 2d 110, 355 N.E.2d 883 (1975).
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and ordinarily excludable from evidence when made unavailable
to [defendant], where there is no evidence that the ampoules
and solution, if preserved, could be scientifically examined so as
to produce conclusive results the results of the breathalyzer
test may be admitted."
Scientific Reliability
Courts arrive at a finding of scientific reliability by examining the
ways in which ampoules might be used to derive evidence that
would bolster the defendant's case, such as the impeachment of the
breathalyzer test results that establish the statutorily mandated
presumption of intoxication.8 ' The burden of demonstrating favora-
bility rests squarely on the defendant; therefore, the court rarely will
raise possible methods of ampoule analysis sua sponte and will ad-
dress only those methods presented by the defense. 2 The ampoule
may be used to impeach the credibility of breathalyzer test results
in several ways. Often, however, courts blur the distinctions by
assuming that if one method of examining the ampoule cannot pro-
vide scientifically reliable evidence, then other methods are simi-
larly defective. The defense could use the ampoules to uncover evi-
dence in four basic ways. The first and most controversial method
is the actual retesting of the test ampoule in an attempt to redeter-
mine the subject's blood-alcohol level at the time the test was ad-
ministered. 3 In addition, the defendant might attempt to determine
what quantity of chemical constituents was present in the test and
reference ampoules at the time of testing, given that chemical vol-
ume is critical to test results. 4 A third method checks the quality
of the test solution in terms of the percentages of chemical re-
quired. 85 The final method is a physical examination of the ampoule
tube itself as a check on optical defects or imperfections that could
have affected test results.8 Only actual retesting of the ampoule
80. Id. at -, 355 N.E.2d at 885.
81. See note 44 supra & accompanying text.
82. In Canaday, the court discussed two ways in which used ampoules might be useful,
but concluded that the ampoules would not be material evidence in a constitutional sense.
Routine destruction and disposal of the used ampoules therefore did not violate due process.
83. See Bellotti, supra note 26; Watts, supra note 27.
84. See I R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at § 5B.02.





would give the defendant a new reading on the blood-alcohol con-
tent at the time of testing; the other checks would provide informa-
tion that could impeach the accuracy of the test results presented
by the state, but would not provide an alternate reading."
The feasibility of an actual redetermination of alcohol content of
the blood of the defendant has been a source of conflict among
experts. The consensus of the courts on this method of gaining evi-
dence from an ampoule was stated accurately in Canaday"
"Although retesting is claimed to be reliable by some scientists,
others are not persuaded" and the prodecure has not yet achieved
general scientific acceptance.88 Similarly, one commentator notes
that "[e]xperts are apparently in agreement that it is difficult if
not impossible to make a re-run of the breath determination from
an ampoule after the completion of the test wth any degree of accu-
racy "s' Even courts that have granted the defendant's motion to
suppress on the basis of the ampoule's unavailability have ques-
tioned the feasibility of an actual redetermination of blood-alcohol
content and ultimately have relied on a finding that ampoule analy-
sis in general will furnish scientifically reliable information.
In Lauderdale v. State,9" the Supreme Court of Alaska found that,
although the test and reference ampoules could furnish probative
evidence of the propriety of the breathalyzer test in several ways,
the retesting method might not be one of these ways because
"[a]pparently, at the present time, it is not possible to rerun a test
and obtain accurate results."9 The court, however, found that re-
testing might be viable in part:
But even now, the test of a used ampoule could be made again,
and if the results were less than those originally obtained, the
original results would be suspect. The reason for this is that the
passage of time, with the chemical changes m the solution in the
ampoule, would normally cause the test results to show an
increase in blood alcohol."2
87. Evidence that would impeach the credibility of the prosecution's test results clearly is
critical to the defendant's case; an effective attack on the test's accuracy will force the
prosecution to rely on evidence other than test results, and will weaken significantly its case
against the defendant.
88. 90 Wash. 2d at -, 585 P.2d at 1187.
89. 1 R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at § 5B.04A.
90. 548 P.2d 376 (Alas. 1976).
91. Id. at 379-80.
92. Id. at 380 (emphasis supplied).
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Similarly, in Hitch, the court noted that the original breath test
"cannot be duplicated with 100% accuracy "3 As was the Alaska
court in Lauderdale, however, the California court was willing to
base a finding of scientific reliability of ampoule-derived evidence
on two other modes of testing the ampoule: the measurement of the
volume of the chemicals in the ampoule; and the analysis of the
glass of the ampoule itself. 4
In only one recorded case did a court respond more favorably to
the defendant's contention that a retest would furnish scientifically
reliable evidence. In State v. Michener,5 the Court of Appeals of
Oregon announced that "we have found substantial evidence in this
record to support the finding of the circuit court that '[i]t is scien-
tifically possible to independently re-test the accuracy of the
breathalyzer reading."'
96
Courts holding that the inaccessibility of a breathalyzer ampoule
is not a denial of the defendant's due process rights have been even
less sanguine about the reliability of redetermining initial test re-
sults. In State v. Bryan,97 the Superior Court of New Jersey found
that testimony favoring such redetermination was "based upon ne-
bulous theories" which were only in the embryonic stage. 8 The pros-
93. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 645 n.1, 527 P.2d 361, 364 n.1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 n.1 (1974).
94. The court in Lauderdale considered a quantity and quality check of ampoule solution
and found these two analyses to be viable:
The test and reference ampoules could be probative evidence of the propriety
or impropriety of the breathalyzer test for several reasons. From the witness's
testimony, it appeared that it was critical to the results of the test that precisely
three milliliters of solution be contained in the ampoules; if the volume was less
than three milliliters, the final result would be a falsely elevated level of alcohol.
This would be true as to both the test and reference ampoules. After the test is
given the quantity of the solution in the reference ampoule can be accurately
measured, and the test itself does not materially change the quantity of solution
in the test ampoule, which can also be measured.
548 P.2d 376, 379 (Alas. 1976).
95. 25 Or. App. 523, 550 P.2d 449 (1976).
96. Id. at -, 550 P.2d at 454 n.11. One subject on which experts have been able to agree
regarding ampoule retention is the instability or tendency to react and undergo chemical
change when uncovered of the chemical solution in the ampoule. In Michener, however, the
court was persuaded by the testimony of the defense's expert that the solution could be kept
stable if properly preserved, thus solving the problem that usually makes ampoule retesting
impossible: "We conclude that the defendants have made a sufficient showing to support
their assertion that had the evidence been available to them, it would have been both favora-
ble and material to the defense." Id. at -, 550 P.2d at 454.
97. 133 N.J. Super. 369, 336 A.2d 511 (1974).
98. Id. at -, 336 A.2d at 514.
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ecution's expert witness in Bryan had testified that there was
no substance to the theory that chemicals in the test ampoule
could be extracted and subsequently used to test the machine
reading. Any rebalancing of the instrument would indeed be
difficult and would require some expertise. A removal and rein-
sertion of the ampoule would probably change the reading, and
it would be impossible after reinsertion to reproduce the initial
results obtained on the breathalyzer."
In State v. Teare,'0 the New Jersey Court again heard expert testi-
mony on both sides of the issue and concluded that the defendant
had not been denied due process based on the fact that
[pireservation of the test ampule [sic] is not feasible or
practical since subsequent testing will not give any scientifically
reliable results, this being due to the uncontrollable changes that
occur in the breathalyzer test ampules after their use in the
breathalyzer test. Furthermore, even if these changes or varia-
tions could be scientifically accounted for and accurately ana-
lyzed, you still could not properly analyze a test ampule subse-
quent to a breathalyzer test because there is simply no predicta-
ble relationship between the changes that occur and the lapse of
time.10'
In addition to attempts to actually redetermine initial test re-
sults, test and reference ampoules can be checked to determine the
volume of solution. Courts have been more willing to accept this test
as a method of gleaning evidence valuable to the defense. Experts
agree that the volume of the solution in the ampoules is critical to
test results"2 and the process of checking the solution volume is not
as complex or impractical as a simulation of the initial blood-
alcohol test run by the police.
Volume testing is based on the requirement that the test ampoule
contain exactly three milliliters of the potassium-dichromate/
sulfuric acid solution. If the ampoule contains less than this
volume, test results could be elevated falsely 103 In Hitch, the
99. Id. at -, 336 A.2d at 513.
100. 135 N.J. Super. 19, 342 A.2d 556 (1975).
101. Id. at -, 342 A.2d at 558.
102. See note 94 supra.
103. See generally Watts, supra note 27; DomGOA, CHEnMcAL TEsTs AND Tm LAW (Fischer
ed. 1957).
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trial judge, after calling expert witnesses of his own, wrote a lengthy
and detailed memorandum opinion of the subject, concluding that
"the quantity of three cubic centimeters of solution in the test and
reference ampoules is critical to the test because a lesser amount of
solution will show an artifically high blood alcohol level while a
greater amount will show an artificially low reading."'' 4
In addition to measuring the quantity of chemical present in the
ampoules, the quality of the chemical solution can be measured:
such a test measures the chemical composition of the vial.' 5 The
presence of 0.025% potassium dichromate, which is critical to test
accuracy, can be checked easily in the reference ampoule after the
test has been administered.' 6 Measurement of the solution in the
test ampoule at a later time, however, is more difficult because the
solution has been exposed to a subject's breath, and the chemical
contents have begun to change in response to this exposure. None-
theless, in Lauderdale the court accepted expert testimony that
retest of the test ampoule solution quality was "probably possi-
ble.,,107
The final type of evidence that might be obtained if an ampoule
were available to the defendant for independent analysis, is physical
inspection of the glass of the ampoule.0 5 The glass from which am-
poules are manufactured is not optical glass but is of varying thick-
ness and susceptible to optical defects that could affect the accu-
racy of the test, whether in the test or the reference ampoule.' 0
Preservation of the ampoule after testing would offer an opportunity
for the defendant to check these properties of the ampoule without
the complications involved in the other tests.
104. 30 Cal. App. 3d 675, 106 Cal. Rptr. 606, 607 (1974). See also Van Halen v. Municipal
Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 233, 83 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1969) (holding that the amount of chemical in
a given ampoule may be determined after the test because no material change occurs in the
quantity of the solution in the test ampoule as a result of the test).
105. 548 P.2d 376, 379 (Alas. 1976).
106. Id. The problem is one of chemical instability, an obstruction both to a retesting of
the ampoule and to a check for solution composition. See note 96 supra.
107. 548 P.2d at 379.
108. 12 Cal. 3d at 645 n.1, 527 P.2d at 364 n.1, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 12 n.i.
109. Id. The quality of the glass of which the ampoule is composed may diffuse light going
through the ampoule during testing. The galvanometer consequently will make an adjust-
ment that inaccurately indicates the color loss in the test ampoule. Because color loss is
related directly to the amount of alcohol in a subject's breath, inaccuracy at this stage of the





In addition to the requirement of proving the favorability of the
evidence that the destroyed ampoule would have supplied, the
Brady rule requires that the defendant show that such evidence be
"material either to guilt or to punishment.'"'0 The determination of
materiality by courts is even less predictable than that of favorabil-
ity, perhaps because "[tihe United States Supreme Court has not
attempted to precisely define 'material evidence' or the degree of
prejudice which must be shown by the defendant to make out a
[due process] violation.""' Materiality has been defined variously
as evidence which "might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable
doubt about guilt"'"2 and as evidence which "could possibly
result in . exoneration."1 3
In Canaday, the court emphatically stated that "[tiestimony to
be gained from the ampoules is only tangential to the question of
innocence or guilt. The ampoules are therefore not material in a
constitutional sense.""' 4 Destruction of the ampoules, the court con-
cluded, "does not interfere with the defendant's ability to deter-
mine the facts or raise a defense of nonintoxication."'
The court in Hitch reached the opposite conclusion on the ques-
tion of the materiality of the ampoule. Acknowledging the necessity
of establishing materiality, the Supreme Court of California con-
cluded that "the results of the breathalyzer test by their very nature
constitute material evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence upon
a charge of drunk driving.""' The finding of materiality was linked
to language in the section of the California Vehicle Code that pro-
vided that "if the amount of alcohol in a person's blood at the time
of the test as shown by chemical analysis of his breath was 0.10
percent or more 'it shall be presumed that the person was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.'",7 Breathalyzer test results
therefore were deemed to be material to guilt or punishment be-
110. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
111. State v. Wright, 87 Wash. 2d 783, _, 557 P.2d 1, 4 (1976) (involving a first-degree
murder charge, not drunken driving).
112. Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
113. Hitch, 11 Cal. 3d at -, 520 P.2d at 976, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
114. 90 Wash. 2d at _, 585 P.2d at 1190.
115. Id.
116. 12 Cal. 3d at 647, 527 P.2d at 365, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
117. Id.
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cause they give rise to the presumption of intoxication. The court
reasoned that evidence which could affect substantially the credibil-
ity of those test results must be disclosed to the defendant, or he
would be deprived of the right to a fair trial."' In so stating, the
court found that the absence of the ampoules could have a direct
effect on the quality of the defense that the accused could prepare. "'
The Hitch position on the materiality of ampoules conforms to a
pronouncement made by the United States Supreme Court in rela-
tion to materiality and the government's duty of disclosure, stating
that materiality should be "generously conceived [to include]
all possible defenses. '"1 9.1
The Right of Confrontation
The courts that have refused to accept the defendant's contention
that the unavailability of the breathalyzer ampoule is a denial of
due process usually conclude their discussions with the statement
that the ampoules are deemed neither favorable nor material to the
accused's defense, without further development of the due process
theory Courts more sympathetic to the motion to suppress or dis-
miss, and courts that have held that the defendant has met the
burden of supplying evidence of the ampoule's favorability, have
particularized the due process violation caused by the denial of
independent analysis.
The courts in Hitch,°2 0 Lauderdale,2' and Michener, 2 2 based the
finding of a due process violation on the defendant's inability to
cross-examine the breathalyzer ampoule as an aid to impeaching
the test results on intoxication introduced by the prosecution. The
Supreme Court has recognized that denial of the defendant's right
of cross-examination deprives him of the sixth amendment right to
118. Id. at 648-49, 527 P.2d at 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 14. An analogous finding was made
by the United States Supreme Court in Giglio v. United States: "[wihen the 'reliability of
a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence
falls within [the Brady rule]." 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264, 269 (1959).
119. This is the converse of the finding in Canaday that "destruction of used breathalyzer
test ampoules does not interfere with the defendant's ability to determine the facts or
raise a defense of nonintoxication." 90 Wash. 2d at -, 585 P.2d at 1190.
119.1. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
120. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
121. 548 P.2d 376 (Alas. 1976).
122. 25 Or. App. 523, 550 P.2d 449 (1976).
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confront the witnesses against him.1rs The right to cross-examine is
critical, therefore, because confrontation constitutes "[o]ne of the
fundamental guarantees of life and liberty"'' 4 and is essential to due
process. 12
In finding the absence of the breathalyzer ampoule a denial of the
defendant's right of confrontation, courts have compared the am-
poule to a witness for the prosecution who is unavailable for cross-
examination. 2 8 More specifically, the court in Hitch likened the
ampoule to an informer for the prosecution whose identity the state
seeks to withhold. 127 The rule "consistently expounded and applied"
in that context is that "[w]hen it appears from the evidence that
an informer is a material witness on the issue of the defendant's
guilt, the informer's identity may be helpful to the defendant and
nondisclosure would deprive him of a fair trial. The People either
must disclose his identity or incur a dismissal."' 128 Applying the
informer rule to the lost ampoule case, the court found that the test
results must be suppressed because disclosure of the ampoule is
impossible when it has been destroyed rather than merely with-
held.' ' This view of the breathalyzer ampoule is one that regards
the ampoule as the repository of evidence that is unavailable from
any other source.
Other courts have viewed the ampoule as merely providing evi-
dence that is ascertainable from other sources so that its absence is
not crucial to the defendant's case. In Canaday, the court found that
the defendant had not been denied the opportunity to confront the
witnesses against him because the test operator's testimony pro-
123. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (the sixth amendment right to confrontation is
applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment). Adopted in 1787, the sixth amend-
ment requires "that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be
confronted with.the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
124. 380 U.S. at 404, quoting Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1899).
125. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers, the defendant was not
permitted to cross-examine his own witness by virtue of the Mississippi common law theory
that one may not impeach his own witness. Reversing, the Supreme Court emphasized that
"[tihe right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair
opportunity to defend against the State's accusations," id. at 294, and that "[tjhe right of
cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the consti-
tutional right of confrontation." Id. at 295.
126. People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
127. Id. at , 527 P.2d at 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. at -.
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. Id.
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vided the defendant with "adequate opportunity at trial to impeach
the credibility of the officer without access to the used ampoule.' ' 0
Similarly, in United States v. Sewar,13' the Ninth Circuit equated
test operator testimony with the information that the ampoule
might provide and thus dismissed the question of the necessity of
availability of the ampoule:
It is the technician who made the test, not the blood sample, who
will be witness against [the defendant]. [The defendant] will
be able to cross-examine the technician. The fact that the sample
is missing will make cross-examination more difficult, but that
does not amount to a denial of confrontation. 32
In Lauderdale, however, the Alaska court felt that the ampoule
could provide information that a test operator could not, and that
"[a] denial of the right to make [a scientific analysis of breathaly-
zer components] that is to say, to 'cross-examine' the results
of the test, would be reversible error without any need of a showing
of prejudice. It would be a denial of a right to a fair trial. 1' 3 The
court distinguished evidence that is represented at trial by some
other evidence or testimony and an ampoule, which might give evi-
dence that can be elicited from no other source. Comparing the
destruction of a police officer's notes with the destruction of the
ampoule, the court stated that
[t]he maker of the notes testified at the trial and was sub-
ject to cross-examination, even though the defense was denied
the opportunity tb see the notes. In the instant case, the
critical "witness," i.e., the ampoule which established the pre-
sumption of [defendant's] guilt, is not available for cross-
examination by defense. We believe this difference is of major
importance.'34
Since the notes were the work product of the policeman himself, he
could be cross-examined as to their contents. An ampoule, however,
might reveal defects in contents or composition that are not within
the test operator's knowledge. The officer, therefore, could not tes-
130. 90 Wash. 2d at -, 585 P.2d at 1189.
131. 468 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973).
132. Id. at 238.
133. 548 P.2d at 381 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 382 n.11. The court distinguished Wright v. State, 501 P.2d 1360 (Alas. 1972).
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tify to such information even if he were cross-examined effectively
and he answered truthfully and completely Similarly, the certifi-
cate of test results would not reflect the data that could be gleaned
from the ampoule itself.'35
For these reasons, neither the certificate nor the test operator
provides the opportunity for complete cross-examination that the
analysis of the ampoule would afford. On this basis, the court in
Hitch dispensed with the argument that an ampoule was demon-
strative evidence and thus not analogous to a witness' testimony-
[H]ere, the nondisclosed evidence was in a real sense "lost" to
the defendant, as effectively as if it had been destroyed. While
we deal here with demonstrative evidence rather than with
the testimony of living witnesses, we find the difference of no
significance since if it were available and disclosed it would nor-
mally require the testimony of a living witness to facilitate its
introduction and possibly to explain it. Accordingly just as in the
instance of the mformer a defendant seeks a witness who might
give favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence, so in
the present situation a defendant seeks demonstrative evidence
which might be favorable to him.'36
THE PROSECUTION'S DUTY
Good Faith
As discussed previously, courts that address the due process as-
pect of ampoule destruction will look not only to the protected scope
of the defendant's rights but also to the prosecution's conduct. The
basic proposition of Brady v. Maryland, as applied in most states,
is that when evidence favorable and material to the defendant's case
is suppressed, the good or bad faith of the state is irrelevant.'3 7
Courts have made a distinction, however, between the suppression
of evidence and the destruction of evidence, ruling that in the latter
instance, the good or bad faith of the state will be considered in
deciding whether the defendant's due process rights have been vio-
lated.'38 In examining the motivation of the prosecution in destroy-
135. For a discussion of breath test result certificates, see notes 180-83 infra & accompany-
ing text.
136. 12 Cal. 3d at -, 527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. at - (citation omitted).
137. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (defendant charged with murder). See also Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376, 381-82 (Alas. 1976).
138. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969)(involving the jurisdiction of the
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Ing evidence, the courts have applied a "surrounding circumstan-
ces" test. 39 The elements of the test are whether the destruction
occurred in the normal course of procedure and whether the govern-
ment can explain the destruction adequately 140 If the government
can convince the court on these issues, no due process violation will
be found."'
The good faith/bad faith distinction has been accepted in cases
analogous to the breathalyzer test situation. In United States v.
Sewar,4 2 a test had been run on the defendant's blood, and the
techncian, who was unaware that the sample should be retained,
had discarded it.' The trial court granted the defendant's motion
to suppress the blood-alcohol test results because the sample had
been destroyed before the defendant could run an independent anal-
ysis. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.'44 Although nothing was
available to represent the lost blood sample, the court held that the
inadvertence of the destruction prevented an inference of bad faith
and allowed the state to introduce the test results into evidence.",
Several courts have applied the Sewar approach to breathalyzer
court of claims to review 3udgments of courts-martial). The rationale for this distinction
appears to be that when evidence has been destroyed, rather than merely suppressed, the
impossibility of the state's complying with an order to produce favorable, material evidence
would result in a dismissal of the case. When the prosecution and law enforcement officers
have acted in good faith, the courts have felt that finding a due process violation that might
demand dismissal would impose too great a sanction on the prosecution.
139. The "surrounding circumstances" test initially was applied in a situation in which the
destroyed evidence was not completely lost to the defendant. The notes that formed the
background for an officer's testimony had been destroyed, but the testimony itself still could
be cross-examined in court. Id. The difference is that the notes are considered a vehicle to
refresh the officer's memory in court, rather than independent proof of guilt or innocence. In
the note-destruction situation, the source of the destroyed notes is present in court; when
ampoules are destroyed, however, the independent testimony they could provide becomes
totally unavailable to the defendant. For an argument contending that both the destruction-
of-notes standard and the suppression standard for determining due process violations are
inapposite to situations in which evidence other than notes has been destroyed, see Note, The
Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence Doctrine, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1361 (1975). Some courts have resolved the situation by holding that
"in destruction of evidence cases, as in true suppression cases the motive of those
destroying the items is not determinative." State v. Wright, 87 Wash. 2d 783, -, 557 P.2d
1, 7 (1976).
140. 393 U.S. at 355.
141. Id.
142. 468 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 237-38.
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situations.' The court in Hitch, however, resolved the good
faith/bad faith distinction differently The court refused to find that
the mere absence of bad faith would defeat the defendant's due
process argument, yet also declined to find that surrounding cir-
cumstances were irrelevant. Instead, the court announced the quasi-
legislative mandate that in the future, sanctions would be imposed
unless the prosecution can show that the governmental agencies
involved have established, enforced and attempted in good faith
to adhere to rigorous and systematic procedures designed to pre-
serve the test ampoule and its contents and the reference am-
poule used in such chemical tests. The prosecution shall bear the
burden of demonstrating that such duty to preserve the ampoules
and their contents has been fulfilled.'47
Hitch thus indicates that good faith plus great vigilance will allow
the state to introduce breathalyzer test results without violating the
defendant's due process rights even when the ampoules have been
destroyed. Conversely, if the state has not been malicious, but
merely negligent in destroying the ampoules, a due process violation
will be found, and the breathalyzer test results will not be admitted
into evidence. In addition, the Hitch holding suggests that even
courts willing to acknowledge the favorability and materiality of
ampoules to the defendant's case will find no due process violation
if the prosecution has done all that it possibly could to avoid de-
struction.
The good faith of the prosecution operates in one additional con-
text. A court that finds that the destruction of ampoules violated
due process by depriving the defendant of favorable, material evi-
dence then must decide whether merely to suppress the breathaly-
zer results in an attempt to balance the inequity of the ampoule's
loss, or whether to dismiss the charge against the defendant. Courts
regard a finding of a due process violation and a remedy of suppres-
sion of test results as a sanction against the prosecution; therefore,
the more reprehensible the behavior of the prosecution, the more
stringent the sanction.4 ' Although the courts acknowledge that the
146. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 48 Ohio App. 2d 110, -, 355 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1975), in
which the court held that malicious destruction of the ampoule is to be considered in decid-
ing whether breathalyzer results are inadmissible when the ampoule is unavailable for in-
dependent analysis by the defendant.
147. 12 Cal. 3d at -, 527 P.2d at 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. at -.
148. Id.
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ampoules "would merely impeach the test results [rather
than] conclusively establish innocence"'' and that suppression of
the test results is a sufficient remedy for the defendant, they have
found that bad faith destruction raises the possibility that the am-
poules were destroyed because they would show conclusively that
the defendant was not intoxicated.' In this instance, the proper
defendant's remedy/prosecution's sanction is to dismiss the charge,
rather than merely to suppress the test results.15
Admirnstrative Conventence
In addition to considering the good faith of the prosecution, the
courts will examine the administrative inconvenience that might
attend the requirement that the prosecution preserve the test am-
poule. If the burden upon the prosecution is deemed unreasonable,
the court is likely to find the ampoule's preservation to be beyond
the scope of the defendant's due process rights. The courts, however,
have differed m their evaluations of the difficulty of retaining the
ampoule for the defendant's later analysis. 2 In State v. Grose, 5 the
defendant was denied his motion to suppress breathalyzer test re-
sults despite the unavailability of the ampoule for his independent
testing. The Municipal Court of Findlay, Ohio, stated that "[t]o
require that the test ampoule be retained is to place an addi-
tional burden on the state, not required by the Legislature."'54
Indeed, some expert testimony supports the view that ampoule
preservation would be exceedingly cumbersome. In an extended
treatment of the defense of drunk driving cases, Richard Erwin
points out that to avoid the chemical changes that will render later
analysis of the ampoule meaningless, the tube must be sealed her-
149. Id. at - , 527 P.2d at 370 n.7, 117 Cal. Rptr. at -.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The question often arises when the court is considering the matter of whether the
evidence derived from ampoules would be favorable to defendant's case. In discussing the
scientific reliability necessary for admission of evidence, courts address the feasibility of
ampoule retention thus arriving at a determination of scientific reliability which is, in fact,
conditioned by the ease with which ampoules may be kept. Often, however, the matter is one
of scientific significance because the question of actual retesting involves assessing the possi-
bility of chemical changes of solution, which, according to some experts, renders retesting not
merely infeasible but impossible.
153. 45 Ohio Misc. 1, 340 N.E.2d 441 (1975).
154. Id. at -, 340 N.E.2d at 443.
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metically after use in the first test and stored in an upright position
to avoid contact with the atmosphere or other substances that can
cause contamination. 55 He notes that "[w]hile the preservation of
the ampoules, as defense evidence, can be of great use to the defen-
dant,. [nonetheless, the retention of ampoules] is a diffi-
cult procedure." 5 ' Removal of the ampoule from the machine, con-
tamination, and spilling of the solution present the primary prob-
lems. '5
In State v. Shutt, "I the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found
hazards in the preservation of breathalyzer test ampoules. The court
noted that "[a]fter the test, the ampoules are open glass tubes with
jagged edges containing a solution of sulphuric acid. The possibility
of sealing them is remote, [and] the probability of contamination
is great."1 59 Because safety requires that used ampoules be de-
stroyed, operator's directions for administering the breathalyzer test
have contained the instruction to discard the ampoule subsequent
to testing. The court concluded that this did not deprive the defen-
dant of due process of law 160
Other courts have not accepted the administrative inconvenience
theory so willingly In Lauderdale, the court was unpersuaded by
the prosecution's arguments of "'serious difficulties' and 'tre-
mendous efforts'" required by the preservation of breathalyzer
ampoules because it was "certain that the state, with all of its vast
human resources, will be able to find suitable methods to preserve
the ampoules." '' In Michener, the court made the affirmative fac-
tual finding that "storage of the ampoule is both economically and
scientifically feasible and would not place a burden upon the police
agencies" because the ampoule could be retained "in an inexpensive
laboratory jar and stored in a dark location"1 2 with a modicum of
155. 2 R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at § 22.03[2][i].
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 116 N.H. 495, 363 A.2d 406 (1976).
159. Id. at _, 353 A.2d at 407. The court in Shutt pointed to a difference in the ampoule
procedure in the Hitch case. In California, the court noted, ampoules are not factory-sealed
and thus do not have to be broken open for testing as they do m New Hampshire. The court
in Hitch, therefore, was not dealing with as pronounced a safety hazard as in Shutt, because
in California used ampoules would not have jagged glass tops. Id.
160. Id. at _, 363 A.2d at 407-08.
161. 548 P.2d at 382.
162. 25 Or. App. at -, 550 P.2d at 451 n.5, 452.
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difficulty for the state.1 13
To bolster the argument that preservation of the ampoule would
require too great a burden on law enforcement agencies, the state
has pointed to the protection already available to safeguard the
defendant's rights in the same way One such safeguard is the spot
checking required in most states as an indication of ampoule regu-
larity After they are manufactured and filled, ampoules are given
batch numbers by the manufacturer to indicate that all ampoules
of the same batch number contain the same chemical compound.'64
Spot checking usually is performed by an independent laboratory
that takes a representative sampling of ampoules from a given
batch, analyzes their contents and construction, and then issues a
certificate stating that the selected ampoules are of the required
type and chemical strength.165 Although several courts have found
spot checking sufficient, 6 others have stated that spot checking is
not likely to locate defects and that the only way to guarantee that
defects will be detected is to allow the defendant to analyze the
ampoule after the test has been given."' The latter procedure gives
163. The court in Michener made more optimistic findings of the feasibility and reliability
of ampoule retention and analysis. Its conclusions were based on acceptance of the testimony
of the defense's expert witnesses to a degree unparalleled in other ampoule retention decision
and, therefore, should not be read as representing the position of a majority of courts.
164. See Watts, supra note 27, at 85-86.
165. Id. at 86.
166. E.g., in State v. Baker, 56 Wash. 2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960), the Supreme Court of
Washington found spot checking an adequate safeguard for defendant and a permissible
substitute for an independent analysis of the used ampoule after the test:
The fact that the sealed ampoules are delivered by the manufacturer of the
breathalyzer machine for exclusive use in such machine plus the additional fact
or regular spot checking of the ampoules is, in our opinion, sufficientpnma facie
proof that the chemicals in any one ampoule are of the proper kind and mixed
to the proper proportion.
Id. at -, 355 P.2d at 811 (emphasis original). The defense in Hitch, however, argued that
errors can exist even in ampoules delivered sealed from the manufacturer. One commentator
notes, however, that this argument has been given little credence, rarely is successful as a
matter of law, and is primarily used as a jury argument. See Watts, supra note 27, at 85. See
also State v. De Vito, 125 N.J. Super. 478, 311 A.2d 753 (1973) (evidence admissible where
state trooper had tested equipment shortly before, using an ampoule taken at random from
among those supplied from the same laboratory).
167. Expert testimony of a forensic chemist in the Municipal Court of Beverly Hills empha-
sized the uncertainty of the effectiveness of spot checking of ampoule batch samples:
Q: In your experience, are these random sample tests valid for an entire num-
bered batch of ampoules?
A: No.
Q: Do you have any factual basis for your opinion?
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the defendant access to the particular ampoule used in his test
rather than just general assurance of the regularity of the entire
batch.'
Another safeguard that the prosecution may advance as proof
that the defendant has adequate assurance that the ampoule used
in his test was accurate is the right to independent analysis at the
time of the fnitial test. In State v. Superior Court,"'6 the Supreme
Court of Arizona held that ampoule disclosure was unnecessary be-
cause the accused's opportunity to have independent tests made at
the time of his arrest served as sufficient safeguard of his due pro-
cess rights, and that the state could not be required to recreate
conditions at the time of the original test by furnishing the used
ampoule.' ° Similarly, in State v. Bryan,'17 the Superior Court of
New Jersey stated that "[t]he State should not be forced to afford
the defendant a second chance to check the workability of the ma-
chine when defendant has the opportunity to an independent
test."7 2
The courts' concern that the prosecution be required to preserve
evidence only to a reasonable extent also is demonstrated by the
limitations on the prosecution's duty to lay a foundation13 prior to
A: Yes. In fact, m one box I checked with the same batch number, some
gauged properly and some did not. Some with the same batch number had the
right amount of chemical and some did not. Spot checking is not really 100
percent accurate.
2 R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at § 22.08A, citing testimony of Roger Sylvia, forensic chemist,
Municipal Court of Beverly Hills, 1971.
Similarly, a March 1979 interview with a law-enforcement officer who has administered
hundreds of breathalyzer tests in Hampton, Virginia, revealed that a spot-checked batch of
ampoules often will contain a few that are maccurate as to chemical volume. The officer
stated, "When I find one or two like that in a box, I discard the rest of the ampoules in that
box."
168. The court in Lauderdale stated that absent the opportunity to check the particular
ampoule used in his test, a defendant is denied important evidence because ampoules in the
same batch are not necessarily of the same regularity. 548 P.2d at 381-82.
169. 107 Ariz. 332, 487 P.2d 399 (1971).
170. Id. at _, 487 P.2d at 401.
171. 133 N.J. Super. 369, 336 A.2d 511 (1974).
172. Id. at -, 336 A.2d at 514.
173. See 2 R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at § 22.04. When chemical tests were first accepted into
evidence, courts demanded expert testimony as to the principle of the test and the approved
statutory procedures and correct administration. Now, however, the scientific theory of the
breathalyzer is judicially noticed without expert testimony, and questions of relevance are
regulated by statute. See People v. Donaldson, 36 App. Div. 2d 37, 319 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1971).
See also McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 209.
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the admission of breathalyzer test results into evidence. The scope
of the requirements for laying a foundation reflects how the courts
and legislatures balance the defendant's rights against the require-
ment that the prosecution's burden not be excessive.
In states that use breathalyzer tests, the prosecution's burden
may include the following: proof of the test operator's skill and
license to administer the test as required by statute;7 4 ""roof that the
machine itself was in proper working order at the time of the test;,"
proof that the ampoules used were mixed properly and that they
were part of a batch that was spot checked; 17 and proof that the test
was conducted in accordance with approved methods and proce-
dures as determined by the department of health.177 Depending on
the degree to which the particular state seeks to facilitate admission
of breath test results, the courts and legislatures might require that
174. As one commentator cautioned, "[a]n effective operator must be something more
than a person who merely knows the proper buttons to push or turn in making a test." Watts,
supra note 27, at 91. The author recommended that operators be encouraged to develop as
much expertise as possible in chemical testing and to keep those skills updated by classes
and periodic examinations. Id. Watts also suggested that close supervision might obviate the
need for sophisticated knowledge on the part of every person administering the test. Id.
Although the proper working condition of the equipment can be demonstrated by showing
that the machine was tested or calibrated at specific intervals before and after the particular
test, commentators on the question of defense of drunken driving cases recommend that
defense counsel seek discovery of maintenance and repair records. See generally 2 R. ERWIN,
supra note 8, at § 22.03[3]; Watts, supra note 27.
175. See generally ERwiN, supra note 10; WA'rs, supra note 27.
176. In People v. Todd, 79 Misc. 2d 630, 360 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1974), the Delaware County
Court found error in the admission of breathalyzer results when the operator testified that
he knew nothing of ampoule condition or the duration of their storage at police barracks, and
the prosecution presented no proof of any random sampling of the lot of ampoules. Therefore,
no evidence was introduced as to whether the ampoules were of the proper quality of glass or
whether they contained the proper quality-and quantity of solution. Id. at -, 360 N.Y.S.2d
at 760. Similarly, in Cody v. State, 548 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. 1977), the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that in order to introduce breathalyzer results the state must prove
the use of properly compounded chemicals, the existence of periodic supervision of the ma-
chine, and an operator who understands the scientific theory behind the machine's operation.
Id. at 404. By so deciding, the court took the position that the proper procedure affects not
only the weight, but also the admissibility of the test result evidence.
177. In City of Monroe v. Robinson, 316 So. 2d 119 (La. 1975), the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held that the prosecution is not required to provide expert testimony regarding how
the ampoules are handled, whether they are tested, or whether the scientific theory behind
them is sound. The statutory requirements that the test be authorized by the State Board of
Health and the operators be certified were considered substitutes for a showing of accuracy
and validity at least as to the issue of admissibility. Id. at 122-23. In Commonwealth v. Sweet,
232 Pa. Super. 372, 335 A.2d 420 (1975), despite the fact that no evidence affirmatively
showed proper quality or quantity, test results were admissible.
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each of the above proofs be given' 8 with varying degrees of detail,,'"
or they might permit all of these assertions to be subsumed by the
admission of a certificate that records test results and stipulates
that the above requirements have been fulfilled.
In jurisdictions permitting admission of duly attested certificates,
assertions as to compliance with the requirements of operator's skill,
machine operability, and procedural regularity are deemed prima
facie evidence of the facts recited.8 0 In such situations, the certifi-
cate is self-authenticating and the prosecution faces no burden of
proving the averments unless the defendant raises doubt as to the
truth of the statements.'' Two caveats apply when certificates are
so admitted: only factual assertions, not matters of opinion, that
appear in the certificate are admissible as prima facie evidence; and
the truth of the statements is presumed for purposes of admissibility
only and is not conclusive as an ultimate showing of procedural
regularity 182
The use of a self-authenticating certificate as prima facie evi-
dence to lay the foundation of procedural regularity for admission
of breathalyzer results usually is accompanied by the rule that, if
the defendant demonstrates procedural irregularity, such a showing
will go only to the weight accorded to the breathalyzer test results
178. See State v. Baker, 56 Wash. 2d at _ 355 P.2d at 809-10, in which the Supreme
Court of Washington carefully delineated the necessary foundation for the admission of
breath test results using a similar, but slightly different, categorization of admission require-
ments. In Baker, the court emphasized that prima facie evidence of the fulfillment of these
requirements must be introduced before breathalyzer test evidence is admissible. Id. at 810;
accord, State v. Sickles, 25 Ohio App. 2d 1, 265 N.E.2d 787 (1970). But see State v. Hayes,
73 Wash. 2d 568, 439 P.2d 978 (1968), in which the court stated that evidence of breathalyzer
results introduced prior to the evidence necessary for laying a proper foundation was not
prejudicial error. See generally MCCORMcK, supra note 1, at § 209. For an example of exhaus-
tive, direct examination of an expert witness to lay the foundation for the admission of
breathalyzer results, see 2 R. ERwiN, supra note 8, at § 26.06 n.16 (Supp. 1979), quoting State
v. Hendel, 468 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1971).
179. For illustrations of various foundation requirements of different states, see State v.
Rines, 269 A.2d 9 (Me. 1970) (requirements as to chemicals used in blood sampling preserva-
tion kit); People v. Lyall, 372 Mich. 607, 127 N.W.2d 345 (1964) (blood sample identification
and chain of evidence); Bean v. Riddle, 423 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. 1968); Benner v. B.F Goodrich
Co., 150 Mont. 97, 430 P.2d 648 (1967) (test procedure); State v. Magoon, 128 Vt. 363, 264
A.2d 779 (1970) (qualifications of test administrator); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 971 (1961).
180. Virginia is among these jurisdictions. See note 201 infra & accompanying text.
181. See People v. Crawford, 23 Ill. App. 3d 398, 318 N.E.2d 743 (1974); State v. Hamaker,
524 S.W.2d 176 (Mo. App. 1975).
182. See note 205 infra & accompanying text.
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by the jury and will not affect admissibility 183 Although a showing
of irregularity by the defendant would have to be encompassed in
an instruction to the jury, the result of a "weight only" provision
clearly means that the test results will get to the jury regardless of
procedural compliance, and that these states have tipped the due
process balance in favor of the prosecution. Even in jurisdictions
that grant the motion to strike breathalyzer test results when the
defendant demonstrates a material failure to comply with test pro-
cedures, that evidence is still before the jury despite the trial judge's
instruction to ignore it.84
The prosecution in arguing its side of the ampoule-retention con-
flict doubtless will marshal all of the above arguments. Administra-
tive inconvenience, legislative intent to facilitate drunken driving
tests shown by the minimal foundation that the prosecution must
lay, and the safeguards of spot checking and independent testing,
all will be central to the contention that to require the prosecution
to retain the ampoules is unreasonable. If the prosecution con-
vinces the court of the unreasonableness of this requirement, then
the failure to retain the ampoule will not violate due process.
THE VIRGINIA POSITION
Prediction of the Virginia reaction to a constitutional challenge
to the unavailability of breathalyzer ampoules requires examination
of Virginia case and statutory law concerning the due process issue,
and the balancing of the defendant's rights and the prosecution's
183. In Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958),
the Fourth Circuit noted that
[the receipt in evidence of the certificate does not foreclose inquiry into
the regularity of the procedure, the freedom of the sample from contamination
or the accuracy of the chemical analysis. Such questions, however, go to
the weight of the evidence rather than to the initial admissibility of the certifi-
cate.
Id. at 480. The Virginia statute on the subject combines the self-authenticating certificate
with the weight-and-not-admissibility provision. See note 248 infra & accompanying text.
Some courts have held that the defendant's failure to object to the picture of regularity
presented by certificate of test results can constitute a waiver of the right to show irregularity
at a later time. In that instance, the certificate is deemed sufficient to uphold a conviction
of driving while intoxicated. Kincannon v. State, 541 P.2d 1339 (Okla. Crim. 1975).
184. The striking of the evidence will do little to convince a jury already persuaded by
chemical test results to disregard those results, and its effect is likely to be merely technical.




duty The Virginia Supreme Court has considered the issue of the -
suppression of evidence, but few of these decisions would be applica-
ble in the ampoule-destruction situation. The following forecast of
the Virginia response to an assertion of the defendant's rights to the
ampoule, or suppression of breathalyzer results if the ampoule is
unavailable, is predicated from its present position on the extent of
the prosecution's burden in introducing chemical test results into
evidence. The present attitude of the Virginia court indicates that
it will adopt the Canaday position that "destruction of used breath-
alyzer test ampoules . does not interfere with the defendant's
ability to determine the facts or raise a defense. . Testimony to
be gained from the ampoules is only tangential to the question of
innocence or guilt. The ampoules are therefore not material in a
constitutional sense.""' A review of Virginia case and statutory law
indicates why this reasoning is likely to be adopted by the courts of
the state.
The Duty to Disclose
The Virginia Supreme Court has construed section 8 of the Vir-
ginia Constitution 8' as compelling the commonwealth to "submit
the evidence for and against the accused."' 87 In Stover v.
Commonwealth,8 8 the Virginia Supreme Court quoted the Brady
rule that "suppression of evidence favorable to the accused
. violates due process."'' 9 Similarly, in Smith v. United States, 0
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia re-
quired disclosure of "potentially exculpatory evidence" to avoid a
violation of the defendant's due process rights. 9'
The framework for a due process challenge to material evidence
185. 90 Wash. 2d at -, 585 P.2d at 1190. This position is based on the belief that the
"defendant has adequate opportunity at trial to impeach the credibility of the officer without
access to the used ampoule." Id. at -, 585 P.2d at 1189.
186. This section provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to
call for evidence in his favor." VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
187. Howell v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 894, 896-97, 45 S.E.2d 165, 166 (1947).
188. 211 Va. 789, 180 S.E.2d 504 (1971), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
189. Id. at 795, 180 S.E.2d at 509.
190. 364 F Supp. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1973). The court worded the mandate as a "duty"
although the case at bar involved post-conviction relief. The court held that the withheld
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destroyed by the state, therefore, does exist in Virginia. Any at-
tempt to use that framework in an ampoule-destruction context,
however, will meet two impediments: the attitude of the courts
toward the right-of-confrontation challenge upon which the due
process claim would be based; and the firm commitment of the
courts and legislature to facilitating chemical testing in drunken-
driving prosecutions by minimizing the prosecution's duty in terms
of administration and admission of test results into evidence.
The Right of Confrontation
The right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him
operates in Virginia not only through the federal constitutional
mandate via the sixth and fourteenth amendments, but also
through the state constitution.' This constitutional right of con-
frontation includes the absolute right to cross-examine a witness. 3
A court's acceptance of a right-of-confrontation argument when the
breathalyzer ampoule is unavailable will depend upon whether the
court characterizes the missing ampoules as a witness capable of
providing testimony other than that attested to by the test operator
or in the certificate, or as merely additional evidence, offering infor-
mation already provided by the certificate. Virginia case and statu-
tory law'94 have recognized that "[t]he right to be confronted with
one's accusers does not operate to exclude proper documentary
evidence;" ' therefore, if the evidence derived from the ampoule is
considered incorporated in the certificate of breath test results, the
confrontation argument probably will fail.
The Virginia view of the relation between documentary evidence
and the accused's right of confrontation was first addressed in 1908.
In Runde v. Commonwealth,"8 the Supreme Court of Virginia held:
"The provision of the Bill of Rights, guaranteeing the right of the
accused in all criminal prosecutions to be confronted with the accu-
sers and witnesses, has never been interpreted to exclude proper
documentary evidence."'97 The certificate of a breath test consti-
192. "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to be confronted with the
accusers and witnesses." VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
193. Basham v. Terry, 199 Va. 817, 102 S.E.2d 285 (1958).
194. See VA. Con § 18.2-268(r) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
195. Robertson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 62, 65, 175 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1970).
196. 108 Va. 873, 61 S.E. 792 (1908).
197. Id. at 876, 61 S.E. at 793.
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tutes such proper documentary evidence when it is certified by a
statutorily authorized public official. ' The Virginia Supreme Court
restated this view of the admissibility of scientific test results by
certificate in 1970 in Robertson v. Commonwealth."'9 Citing Runde
as precedent, the court held that the admission of a report of test
results on vaginal swabs taken from two rape victims did not violate
the defendant's right of confrontation. 0
Section 18.2-268(rl) of the Virginia Code provides for a self-
authenticating certificate as follows:
Any individual conducting a breath test under the provisions
of this section and as authorized by the Division shall issue a
certificate which will indicate that the test was conducted in
accordance with the manufacturer's specifications, the equip-
ment on which the breath test was conducted has been tested
within the past six months and has been found to be accurate,
the name of the accused, the date, the time the sample was taken
from the accused, the alcoholic content of the sample, and by
whom the sample was xammed. The certificate, as provided for
in this section, when duly attested by the authorized individual
conducting the breath test, shall be admissible in any court in
any criminal proceeding as evidence of the alcoholic content of
the blood of the accused.21'
198. See VA. CODE § 18.2-268(r) (Cum. Supp. 1979). See also Bracy v. Commonwealth, 119
Va. 867, 89 S.E. 144 (1916). In Bracy the defendant objected to the admission in evidence of
a certificate bearing the results of a test to determine the amount of alcohol in a beverage
performed by a state chemist on the grounds that such admission denied him his constitu-
tional right to confront his accusers. Citing Runde, the court held that the certificate was
admissible. Id. at 869, 89 S.E. at 144-45.
199. 211 Va. 62, 175 S.E.2d 260 (1970).
200. Id. at 65, 175 S.E.2d at 262. In Robertson, test results of the vaginal smears were
admitted under § 19.1-45 of the Virginia Code. The defendant had objected on the grounds
that the admission of the certificate of test results denied him the right to cross-examine the
person who had completed it. In refusing defendant's motion to supress the test results, the
Virginia court was willing to apply the documentary evidence exception to a complex set of
facts.
201. VA. CODE § 18.2-268(rl) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The state need not produce expert testi-
mony about the test; therefore, the defendant must call the test operator as his own witness
and face the problem of whether he can cross-examine this expert. In Virginia, as a rule, when
a party has called a witness as his own, that party is prohibited from asking leading questions
or impeaching the witness; however, the Virginia Code provides for cross-examination of a
witness having an adverse interest. VA. CODE § 8.01-401(A). See Daniels v. Morris, 199 Va.
205, 98 S.E.2d 694 (1957). If a test operator could be characterized as an adverse witness, the
defense could cross-examine as vigorously as if he had been called by the prosecution. The
scope of the permission to cross-examine an adverse witness includes situations in which:
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Given the position of the Virginia courts concerning documentary
evidence, this provision eliminates a right-of-confrontation argu-
ment.
Administrative Convenience
The required procedures of section 18.2-268211 need not be proven
by the testimony of witnesses, because of the self-authenticating
certificate.03 By merely introducing the certificate into evidence,
then, the prosecution lays the foundation for the test results re-
corded therein.2' Although the assertions of procedural regularity in
(1) the witness called was a party to the litigation; (2) the witness had an
adverse financial interest in the outcome; (3) the witness was closely connected
by blood to one party ., (4) the party who was surprised at the testimony
of his own witness asked leave to cross-examine; (5) there was some additional
reason clearly showing that the testimony of the witness was pertinent to the
development of the truth before the jury.
Butler v. Parrocha, 186 Va. 426, 434, 43 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1947). Similarly, if the defendant in the
drunken driving case can show some reason that the prosecution must defend the validity of
the test, the prosecution would have to call the test administrator, and the defense would be
able to cross-examine as he could any witness called by the opposing party.
202. VA. CODE § 18.2-268(rl) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
203. Use of radar tests in evidence receives different treatment in the Virginia Code. Sec-
tion 46.1-198(a) of the Virginia Code provides for checking motor vehicle speed with radio
microwaves, or radar. VA. CODE § 46.1-198(a). The results of radar tests are accepted as prima
facie evidence of speed, and the defendant may not challenge the basic principle behind radar
speed detection. Thomas v. Norfolk, 207 Va. 12,147 S.E.2d 727 (1966). The case law, however,
makes a distinction between general viability of the test in theory and the accuracy of a
particular test by requiring that the prosecution must introduce evidence tending to show
proper setup and recent testing of the machine. Royals v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 876, 879-
80, 96 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1957). In cases where such evidence is not provided by the Common-
wealth, the judgment for conviction based on radar results has been reversed. Id. In addition,
the certificate stating test results is not self-authenticating. In order to lay the foundation
for test admissibility, one officer must testify in court as to the setup procedure and the
testing accuracy.
204. In Robertson, the court offered the rationale for authorizing admission of the certifi-
cate, noting that it was necessary to obviate the need for summoning as witnesses physicians
or technicians whose duty it is to make such scientific and medical findings. "Such a provi-
sion is not only expedient and convenient-it prevents the delay that would result if the
limited number of physicians, chemists and technicians were forced to testify whenever a
report made by them was offered in evidence." 211 Va. at 65, 175 S.E.2d at 262.
The concern with limiting the prosecutorial duty in Virginia is mirrored in Rule 3A:14 of
the Virginia Rules of Court. The rule provides for the discovery and inspection of written
reports of scientific evidence including "blood, urine and breath tests upon a showing
that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request
is reasonable." VA. R. CT. 3A:14(b)(1)-(2) (1979) (emphasis supplied). This rule applies to
felony prosecutions only; therefore, in a drunken driving prosecution, a Class 2 misdemeanor
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the certificate attach for purposes of admission of test results only,
and are not conclusive if the defendant can produce evidence of
irregularity,25 such a showing on his part will go to the weight of the
evidence only and will not affect the actual presentation of test
results to the jury. In this regard, section 18.2-268(s) provides:
The steps herein set forth relating to the taking, handling,
identification, and disposition of blood or breath samples are
procedural in nature and not substantive. Substantial compli-
ance therewith shall be deemed to be sufficient. Failure to com-
ply with any one or more of such steps or portions thereof, or a
variance in the results of the two blood tests shall not of itself be
grounds for finding the defendant not guilty, but shall go to the
weight of the evidence and shall be considered as set forth above
with all the evidence in the case. 211
The provision that chemical test irregularities are deemed proce-
dural rather than substantive reflects a change in the legislative
intent as to whether these requirements were mandatory or merely
directory in nature. Under former section 18.1-55,27 the statute re-
quired strict compliance with the stated procedures, and, absent
such compliance, convictions were required to be reversed.2 11 In
Kyhl v. Commonwealth,"9 the Virginia Supreme Court noted that
"the statute itself calls for a strict compliance with every provision
in it. '210 Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 2  another Virginia case, pro-
vided precedent for this mandatory reading of the original statute.
Faced with the suggestion that the blood used in a test was not the
blood of the defendant, the court upheld the lower court's decision
stating that "before [the jury] should consider the results of the
blood test as evidence against defendant, the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the blood analyzed was the
blood of defendant. '212
in Virginia, the concern with "reasonableness" probably would be more emphatic in such a
prosecution.
205. VA. CODE § 18.2-268(s) (Cum. Supp. 1979). In Stroupe v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 243,
207 S.E.2d 894 (1974), the court stated that the certificate of test results is not conclusive on
the subject of test regularity. Id. at 245, 207 S.E.2d at 896.
206. VA. CODE § 18.2-268(s) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
207. VA. CODE § 18.1-55 (1956) (repealed and superseded 1964).
208. Id.
209. 205 Va. 240, 135 S.E.2d 768 (1964).
210. Id. at 243, 135 S.E.2d at 770.
211. 197 Va. 527, 90 S.E.2d 257 (1955).
212. Id. at 530, 90 S.E.2d at 259.
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The cautious approach of Rodgers and Kyhl and the stringent
standards for adherence to statutory prescription of test methods
were reduced severely by legislation that codified the procedures
and presumptions for blood tests.213 The legislature clearly intended
to minimize the burden imposed on the prosecution, and the case
law reflects that shift. In Shamate v. Commonwealth,24 the Virginia
Supreme Court announced that the question of compliance was to
be deemed procedural rather than substantive. A compelling reason
for the change was the "advance[ment of] the remedy of evils
sought to be suppressed [in convicting drunken drivers] . '215 In
1974, the intent of the legislature to lighten the prosecution's burden
was expressed directly- "[T]he General Assembly intended to
spare the Commonwealth the prosecutarial and financial burdens of
calling two public officers to testify in every drunk driving case
involving breathalyzer test evidence.""2 6
The thrust of legislation on breath testing in Virginia has moved
toward minimization of the prosecution's duties, and withdrawal of
the defendant's opportunity to prevent test results from reaching
the jury even though irregularities in procedure, accuracy, and the
operator's qualifications are demonstrated successfully In forecast-
ing the likely Virginia position on a defendant's motion to suppress
breathalyzer results on due process grounds because of the unavaila-
bility of the ampoule, this predilection for administrative conveni-
ence as manifested in the self-authenticating certificate is impor-
tant. The concomitant minimization of the prosecution's duty of
laying a foundation for test admission and the "procedural only"
provision of the chemical test statute especially must be considered.
The Prosecution's Good Faith
As in other states, a determination of the due process implications
of ampoule destruction must include a decision as to what effect the
good faith of the prosecution's conduct will have on the defendant's
claim. Although the court in Stover217 reiterated the Brady rule that
good faith of the prosecution is irrelevant when evidence favorable
213. 1956 Va. Acts, ch. 557; 1956 (Extra Session) Va. Acts, ch. 45.
214. 207 Va. 877, 153 S.E.2d 243 (1967).
215. Bowman v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 656, 661, 112 S.E.2d 887, 891 (1960).
216. Stroupe v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 243, 245, 207 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1974).
217. 211 Va. 789, 180 S.E.2d 504 (1971).
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and material to the defendant has been destroyed, a strict construc-
tion of that ruling makes it applicable to suppression cases but not
to instances in which the evidence has been destroyed. In support
of this argument, the prosecution could cite Bellfield v
Commonwealth,21 in which the Virginia Supreme Court held that
the defendant does not have an absolute right' to all evidence be-
cause "[w]hile we are vigilant to protect the defendant's rights to
a fair trial, we must likewise be vigilant in maintaining the confid-
ence of our citizens in the police and prosecuting officers. ' 219 The
good faith argument of the prosecution, therefore, would be upheld
in Virginia if the ampoules were destroyed, and, as in Bellfield, the
destruction was nonmalicious and in the normal course of events.
In order to adhere to the philosophy of the legislation on chemical
tests for intoxication, the Virginia courts faced with a due process
challenge on the basis of the state's destruction of the breathalyzer
ampoule doubtless will set high standards for the favorabil-
ity/materiality showing. Ultimately, the due process claim will fail
because ampoules would be deemed, as in Canaday, "only tangen-
tial to the question of innocence or guilt. '22 Additionally, the rejec-
tion of the due process challenge will be supported by a refusal to
impose upon the prosecution an unreasonable burden in administer-
ing breath tests and admitting them into evidence.
THE WISDOM OF VIRGINIA'S PROBABLE POSITION
The Criminal Standard of Guilt
Having posited the line of reasoning likely to be taken by Virginia
courts on the subject of breathalyzer ampoule retention, the ques-
tion remains whether a different response should be urged. Other
issues should be considered before accepting that the probable Vir-
ginia response is the best solution to serve the purposes of both
prosecution and criminal defense. Concededly, the requirement of
access to the ampoule used in his breathalyzer test must be consid-
ered in terms of a reasonable balance between the defendant's rights
and the limitation of prosecutorial duties. Indeed, the very nature
of due process demands that this weighing take place.
218. 215 Va. 303, 208 S.E.2d 771 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 965 (1975).
219. Id. at 307, 208 S.E.2d at 774.
220. 90 Wash. 2d at -, 585 P.2d at 1190.
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After all considerations are balanced, however, the decision must
be tipped in favor of the defendant's rights rather than administra-
tive convenience, mainly because the primary goal of due process is
to provide the defendant a fair trial. The high standard of proof
required of the prosecution in a criminal proceeding indicates that
this is the proper resolution between the defendant's rights/state's
convenience conflict. The United States Supreme Court enunciated
this standard in asserting that the due process clause "protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged. '22' The Court spoke further in Speiser v. Randall:222
Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending
value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error
is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party
the burden of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of
the trial of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.2 2
Added to this protection for the defendant is the mandate to the
jury that he be presumed innocent until proven guilty Both con-
cepts, traditional to criminal law, stand for the proposition that
when doubt persists in the minds of the jury, the defendant, not the
prosecution, should receive the benefit of this doubt, and "if a mis-
take is to be made it should be made in favor of the accused. ' 224
This weighting of the scales in the defendant's favor suggests that
in a criminal proceeding such as a drunken driving charge, the
attractive convenience 225 of accepting unquestioningly chemical test
221. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
222. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
223. Id. at 525-26. McCormick traces the "reasonable doubt" standard to a 1798 case tried
in Dublin, Ireland. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 341 n.88.
224. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 342. McCormick points out that the "presumption of
innocence" label is a misnomer and that "assumption of innocence" would be more accurate
because the principle is not descriptive of a presumption in the sense of an inference deduced
from a given premise but is more akin to a basic premise that exists at the beginning of trial.
Id. at n.43, quoting Carr v. State, 192 Miss. 152, 4 So.2d 887, 888 (1941) (Alexander, J.).
225. The view of drunken driving prosecutions as routine, with emphasis on speed and
practicality makes an elaborate constitutional defense, such as the ones mounted in Hitch
or Lauderdale, seem almost absurd. A constitutional defense appears an academic frivolity
in light of the highly practical fashion in which police and courts handle these cases. In
Lauderdale, the court acknowledged that
there have been many hundreds, if not thousands, of drunk driving cases dis-
posed of where the breathalyzer test has been used. It is fair to assume that in
the great majority of these cases, which are misdemeanors, the fines have been
[Vol. 21:219
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results is not in accordance with the philosophy of the criminal law
The defendant must be offered every reasonable opportunity to con-
struct his defense, and, for the very reason that he need create only
a "reasonable doubt" in the minds of the jury, he must be permitted
access to all evidence that might create such a doubt. In the in-
stance of breathalyzer test results, clearly, availability of the am-
poule might provide the defendant with such evidence. The pre-
dicted Virginia position, therefore, would fail to allow the defendant
to benefit from protective concepts basic to crimihal law
Other factors militate against a casual denial of the defendant's
right to the ampoule. The myriad possibilities for inaccuracy in
breathalyzer tests, the prejudicial impact of introducing test results
to a jury despite assurances that such results create "a rebuttable
presumption only," and the independent testimony available only
from the ampoule all point to the necessity that Virginia require law
enforcement agencies to preserve ampoules or be deprived of the
opportunity to introduce breathalyzer test results into evidence.
The Potential for Error
Despite the enthusiasm of many experts and commentators con-
cerning the accuracy and ease of administration of the breathalyzer
test, great latitude for both human and machine error exists. Con-
sideration of the inherent fallibility of any testing process serves as
a reminder of the inadvisability of merely assuming accuracy Per-
mitted the necessary tools, a defendant could establish a reasonable
doubt as to the test results by locating a particular error in the test
or the test equipment. In Virginia, as in many other states, judicial
notice has been taken of the reliability of the basic scientific princi-
ple of breath testing in general and of the breathalyzer specifically
Accuracy of a particular test result, however, is not synonymous
with acceptance of the basic theory, and by showing actual test
error, the defense could impeach the credibility of the breathalyzer
test."'0
paid, that brief jail sentences, if any, have been served, and that the periods of
license suspensions have expired.
548 P.2d at 383. Despite the temptation to regard drunken driving cases as routine, they are
criminal in nature and this fact should not be forgotten by the prosecution or the defense.
226. The distinction between the acceptability of basic principles and a showing of particu-
lar accuracy of the defendant's own test is recognized in Virginia in provisions of the Virginia
Code dealing with vehicle speed testing by radar. See note 203 supra.
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Appreciation of the many errors that can occur in breathalyzer
testing emphasizes that the ampoule should be recognized as a vehi-
cle for revealing such errors and as critical to the defense of the
accused. Errors in machine setup and balancing can prejudice test
results and give a higher reading of the alcohol content in the sub-
ject's blood than that actually present. 21 Mistakes by the test opera-
tor, either because of insufficient training or failure to follow operat-
ing instructions, also can result in an inaccurate reading.28
In addition to errors of machine setup and operating technique,
the physical condition of the test subject is significant. Pathological
conditions such as bronchitis, emphysema, or the anxiety provoked
by the subject's situation may cause shallow breathing. Any failure
to obtain a deep lung sample will cause inaccuracy since the ratio
between shallow lung air and the blood is not at the 2100:1 ratio
required for test accuracy 22 Similarly, if the defendant had some-
thing in his mouth prior to testing, this can distort the test result
because the chemicals in the ampoule are not specific for ethyl
alcohol but will respond to any volatile hydrocarbon found in the
mouth, throat, or respiratory tract. If these substances are in the
mouth or breath, they can cause the potassium-dichromate/sulfuric
acid solution to turn from yellow to green, thus giving a higher
alcohol reading. Simple substances such as toothache compounds,
denture adhesives, gum medications, menthol-based cough drops
and medications, breath fresheners, mouthwash, or menthol ciga-
227. If the machine is of the type requiring manual setting, the operator might align the
indicator at an initial position to the right of the 0.00 reading, thus causing a final reading
above the actual alcoholic content in the subject's blood. See Bellotti, supra note 26, at 139.
Careful balancing of the machine is necessary to insure that the galvanometer is centered. If
the ampoules are moved subsequent to balancing, this can cause an inaccurate reading. Id.
228. One operator error that can affect the reading is failure to double-test. Also, room air
should be flushed through the machine prior to testing. This is especially important in
instances in which the test is administered in an unventilated room in which the test is given
repeatedly, because room air may be contaminated. The operator's lack of sufficient training
or failure to follow a check list could result in errors in final results. Id. at 140-42.
The test operator's competence and conscientiousness in adhering to strict procedure in
general is perhaps the most fertile basis for discrediting test results. Authors on the subject
urge defense counsel in drunken driving cases to conduct rigorous cross-examination of the
operator on these topics. See td. at 149-50. Even in jurisdictions where demonstrated noncom-
pliance goes to the weight of the evidence only and not to its admissibility, cross-examination
in front of the jury might establish reasonable doubt.




rette smoke can react with the chemicals in the test ampoule in this
way 230
Finally, as discussed earlier, irregularities in the ampoule itself
can cause inaccurate test results.' 3' By testing the ampoule, the
defense can reveal errors germane to the ampoule and possibly those
from other sources, such as the operator or the machine. In
Canaday, the defendant argued that the ampoule, had it been re-
tained, would have contained food particles that would have dem-
onstrated that the subject had something in his mouth that affected
test results. 23 This argument should not be regarded as frivolous,
given the sensitivity of the test to certain commonly used sub-
stances.
The Prejudicialness of Chemical Test Results
Courts often note that the presumption of intoxication created
230. See People v. Navis, 24 fll. App. 3d 842, _., 321 N.E.2d 500, 505 (1974); see also 1
R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at § 18.03. This problem of contaminants in the mouth may be
avoided by the observance of a 15- or 20-minute waiting period during which the operator
can assure himself that the subject has not put anything in his mouth. While the breathaly-
zer instruction manual does not mention a waiting period, training programs usually include
it as mandatory for proper test administration. See Watts, supra note 27, at 89. Waiting
period observance is thus another step on which the operator should be cross-examined to
determine compliance with proper procedure.
Another possible variation involving the physical state of the subject is based on the theory
of extrapolation. Because approximately 45 to 90 minutes are required for absorption of
alcohol in the blood and for peak effect on the central nervous system, a subject might not
be under the influence at the time of vehicle operation, but if tested one or two hours after
his last drink, a high percentage will register. See Bellotti, supra note 26, at 142. Nonetheless,
at a certain alcohol level, courts will assume that the blood-alcohol content was at least as
high at time of driving as at the time of subsequent test, McCoRuaCK, supra note 1, at § 209,
based on the assumption that alcohol is being burned off steadily in the human body. When
there is a delay between the operation of the vehicle and the administration of the test, courts
will accept the content left in the blood based on an average rate at which alcohol clears
from the blood. Id. An Oklahoma court held that with breath and urine tests taken one and
one-half hours after collision, the bum-off rate would be gauged as that of an average 150
pound person, approximately one-third of an ounce per hour. Tems v. State, 239 P.2d 812,
820 (Okla. 1952). Bellotti notes that "the bum off rate of a heavy drinker is 25 percent faster
than that of an abstainer." Bellotti, supra note 26, at 146. Also, the "burn off rate is higher
at higher levels" of intoxication. Id.
231. See notes 37 supra & accompanying text. Although one author contended that a "fail
safe principle" operates with the breathalyzer which assures that errors resulting from either
mechanical failure or operator mistake will produce readings that err on the side of low rather
than high inaccuracies, Watts, supra note 27, at 66, loss of liquid volume is one clear excep-
tion to this.
232. 90 Wash. 2d at - , 585 P.2d at 1189.
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when breathalyzer test results show a certain level of alcohol con-
tent in the blood is a rebuttable presumption.2 3 The effect of such
scientific evidence on the jury, however, may be almost impossible
to rebut effectively In its impact on the trier of fact, the presump-
tion of intoxication is likely to be technically rebuttable but emo-
tionally conclusive. The "exaggerated significance"234 attached to
such results creates in the minds of the fact finder an "aura of
infallibility which is commonly attributed to scientific testing" '
and which "makes it subject to prejudicial abuse." 23 In State v.
Hood,27 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was attuned
to this danger:
There is widespread, if not universal, acceptance without ques-
tion of the results of scientific and mechanical tests, and un-
doubtedly the jury in the present case gave great weight to the
result of the Breathalyzer test. This would be particularly true
where the result of the test is prima facie evidence of being under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.m
233. See, e.g., id. at , 585 P.2d at 1186.
234. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 202.
235. State v. Miracle, 33 Ohio App. 289, -, 294 N.E.2d 903, 908 (1973):
The weight given by the mind to objective scientific testing is necessarily great.
Such evidence eliminates the personal and possible errors of judgment of eyewit-
ness testimony to behavior. It appears to have a complete independence from
the usual frailties and mistakes of observation and substitute therefore the
completely impartial action of scientific testing. We feel this aura of infallibility
which is commonly attributed to scientific testing makes it subject to prejudicial
abuse.
Id.
Similar concerns have affected the view of the use of polygraph results. "The exclusion
seems to rest more upon a judicial estimate of the weight that the trier of fact will give [it]
and a demand that [it] will be almost infallible because the trier will think it so."
McCoRmICK, supra note 1, at § 207.
The inequity of the prosecution's access to scientific evidence unavailable to the defendant
exacerbates the problem of prejudiciality:
Destruction of evidence relevant to the defense in criminal cases raises signifi-
cant questions in itself. The issue becomes even more troublesome, however,
where that destruction occurs after the state has had opportunity to test that
evidence, but before the defense has been allowed a similar opportunity of
evaluation. [This] puts the defendant at a serious disadvantage, since the
opportunity to challenge state test findings will often be largely foreclosed in the
absence of testable quantities.
Note, 75 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 141, at 1379.
236. State v. Miracle, 33 Ohio App. at -, 294 N.E.2d at 908.
237. 155 W Va. 337, 184 S.E.2d 334 (1971).
238. Id. at _ , 184 S.E.2d at 338.
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Because the prosecution's chemical test results qualify as such sci-
entific evidence, they too would have this effect on a jury, and the
best palliative for the prejudicialness of scientific test results on a
jury is the defendant's ability to attempt to impeach that evidence
with similarly compelling evidence of his own.
The opportunity to perform an independent analysis of the am-
poule used in his breathalyzer test allows the defendant to invoke
"hard" science in his defense, rather than less persuasive evidence
such as the testimony of defense witnesses. Considering this ration-
ale, one court has stated that "scientifically it would be better to
allow cross-examination based on scientific re-creation of the read-
ing" than to depend on testimony by the test operator.29 The need
for the ampoule is bolstered by the fact that cross-examination pro-
vides the defense not merely a reiteration of facts gleaned from the
test operator's testimony or the certificate, but offers independent
evidence otherwise unattainable. In this respect, the ampoule repre-
sents an independent source of information and an invaluable cross-
check.
The retention of the ampoule is necessary if the prosecution is to
comply with one of the few affirmative rights granted the defendant
in the Virginia blood-test statute, which requires that the admission
of blood test or breath test results
shall not otherwise limit the introduction of any relevant evi-
dence bearing upon any question at issue before the court, and
the court shall, regardless of the result of the blood or breath test
or tests, if any, consider such other relevant evidence of the condi-
tion of the accused as shall be admissible in evidence.2 40
Clearly, this other evidence includes a challenge to the regula'rity of
test procedures or accuracy of the test by independent analysis of
the ampoule. The defendant's right to introduce evidence of this
nature is established by the Virginia Code provision requiring that
"the defendant shall have the right to introduce evidence on his own
behalf to show non-compliance with the aforesaid procedure or any
part thereof, and that as a result his rights were prejudiced." ''
Overall, the statute leans heavily in favor of administrative conveni-
ence. Therefore, the rights that are established within this code
239. State v. Michener, 523 Or. App. at -, 550 P.2d at 452.
240. VA. CODE § 18.2-268(i) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
241. Id. at § 18.2-268(s).
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section are critical to the defendant; he is denied relevant evidence
if he is denied the ampoule for independent retesting.
Without an opportunity to examine the ampoule in pursuit of
evidence relevant to his case, the defendant's rights under the stat-
ute become insignificant. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v.
Sewar, '2 noted that this denial could render the statutory guarantee
an empty promise:
I'm troubled for whatever precedent this case might make,
and I think it would be unfortunate for the word to get out: "All
right, make your test. If you have any doubt about it, why, throw
the stuff away The results of the test are admissible anyway "
I'm troubled by the situations that might develop in other cases
if we acknowledge that the defense has a right to make its own
test, but we preclude that right just because we don't have the
stuff on hand.243
THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
The use of chemical testing as evidence in criminal prosecutions
in Virginia has progressed a great deal in the last twenty-five years.
In his book, The Law of Evidence in Virginia, Charles Friend states
that
the use of scientific methods of investigation and the accompany-
ing use of expert testimony about these methods has reached a
significant level, to the point that Virginia cannot fairly be said
to lag behind other states in this regard. In fact, Virginia trial
courts have displayed a willingness to explore the uses of certain
investigative techniques not generally recognized elsewhere.24'
Although the right of a defendant to demand access to the ampoule
or suppression of breathalyzer test results if the ampoule is unavail-
able has not been addressed in the courts of Virginia, eventually, the
constitutional challenge will be made. In response to this challenge,
Virginia courts doubtless will adopt the Canaday approach of refus-
ing to find a due process violation.
Despite the probable response of Virginia courts on the issue, this
Note asserts that the spirit of due process is served best by requiring
the prosecution to retain the breathalyzer ampoule for the defen-
242. 468 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973).
243. Id. at 237 (quoting the trial court record).
244. C. FRIEND, supra note 25, at 172.
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dant's independent analysis or suffer the sanction of the suppression
of breath test results. The most efficient way to incorporate a re-
quirement of ampoule retention into law enforcement proceedings
is the approach taken in Hitch in which the Supreme Court of
California concluded that
the investigative agency involved in the test has a duty to pre-
serve and disclose [the ampoules]. Accordingly we hold that,
where, as here, such evidence cannot be disclosed because of its
intentional but nonmalicious destruction by the investigative of-
ficials, sanctions shall in the future be imposed for such nonpres-
ervation and nondisclosure unless the prosecution can show that
the governmental agencies involved have established, enforced
and attempted in good faith to adhere to rigorous and systematic
procedures designed to preserve the test ampoule and its con-
tents. The prosecution shall bear the burden of demonstrat-
ing that such duty to preserve has been fulfilled.2 45
Legislation on the question of retention of breathalyzer ampoules
would serve both defendants and the prosecution. Deciding the
"favorability and materiality" question regarding the ampoules as
a matter of law would eliminate the need for determining anew
whether a breathalyzer ampoule provides evidence favorable and
material to defendant's case, when he attempts to impeach the
breathalyzer test results introduced by the prosecution. This ques-
tion involves basic theory on the nature of ampoules rather than a
particular ampoule in each case; therefore, a single definitive an-
swer is an appropriate solution for eliminating expert battles which
are costly to the prosecution and the defense as well as time-
consuming and confusing to the jury.
Legislating ampoule retention would increase the prosecution's
burden, but would do so in a fashion that would give sufficient
notice 24 of the duty without the risk of the sanction of breathalyzer
245. 12 Cal. 3d at -, 527 P.2d at 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. at _. Missouri has required
ampoule preservation by statute. See State v. Barker, 490 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. 1973). See also 3
OHIO N.U.L. REv. 1339 (1976).
246. Some courts are concerned with providing the law enforcement agencies with suffi-
cient notice before imposing requirements for breathalyzer ampoule retention. This was the
rationale of the court in Hitch in applying stringent requirements only prospectively. 12 Cal.
3d at -, 527 P.2d at 370, 117 Cal. Rptr. at _. In Michener, however, the court refused
to adopt the Hitch "prospective only" ruling and included the defendant in its finding that
the ampoule must be retained. 25 Or. App. at -, 550 P.2d at 454.
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result suppression as the result of an unexpected, successful due
process challenge. When ampoule retention becomes part of the
breathalyzer test routine, the administrative inconvenience will
diminish. Additionally, the mandate to the prosecution is not abso-
lute; destruction that is neither negligent nor malicious will not
prevent introduction of the breathalyzer results in court. To require
the state to act without maliciousness or negligence in its handling
of evidence important to the defendant falls well within the bounds
of reasonability that due process demands of the prosecution's con-
duct. Legislating the requirement of ampoule retention would pro-
vide the defendant with due process protections while affording the
prosecution notice of its responsibilities.
CONCLUSION
The legislative approach to the ampoule-retention controversy is
an ideal solution but unlikely to be adopted in Virginia in the near
future. Until such codification occurs, the best protection for the
defendant faced with breathalyzer test results, but no ampoule ex-
tant to impeach those results, is to present expert testimony during
trial as to the fallibility of the test and the requirement of the
ampoule to impeach. 47 Additionally, defense counsel must request
a strong jury instruction to counter the prejudice attendant in
breathalyzer test result evidence. Erwin suggests the following,
taken from the California Administrative Code:
When a chemical test is given, and testimony concerning the
result is admitted into evidence, you are not conclusively bound
by the result of such evidence. To determine the reliability of
such evidence, you should weigh and consider whether or not the
arresting agency and those parties responsible for preserving and
analyzing the chemical involved have complied with those safe-
guards required. If the evidence relating to said test and
said result creates a reasonable doubt in your mind as to its
accuracy, you can ignore the result of such test.248
247. See generally R. ERWIN, supra note 8; Bellotti, supra note 26; Watts, supra note 27.
248. 2 R. ERWIN, supra note 8, at § 40.10151[d]. This instruction emphasizes for the jury
the provision of § 18.2-268 of the Virginia Code which states that
[flailure to comply with any one or more of such steps [required in giving
the test] shall go to the weight of the evidence and shall be considered as
set forth above with all the evidence in the case, provided that the defendant
shall have the right to show noncompliance with the aforesaid procedure
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Including such an instruction would aid the courts in Virginia in
supporting the observation of the United States Supreme Court in
Brady that "society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly "I4"
ANITA L. ZUCKERMAN
and that as a result his rights were prejudiced.
VA. CODE § 18.2-268(s) (Cum. Supp. 1979). This "weight only" provision should not be
interpreted as having no effect on the defendant's case. If the jury is convinced that there
has been noncompliance with test procedures, this will discredit the results produced by the
prosecution. This may be quite sufficient to cause the jury to find that the defendant was
not, in fact, intoxicated though such is not mandated by discrediting of results. In instances
where the prosecution relies on test results and introduces no other evidence of intoxication
or only evidence which is not persuasive, the "weight only" provision for noncompliance or
successful impeachment of breathalyzer results will result in acquittal.
249. 373 U.S. at 87.
